Denver Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 5

Article 6

1962

Vol. 39, no. 5: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
39 Dicta (1962).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

f

VOLUME

39

1962

f

The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
The University of Denver College of Law
1962

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER,

1962

DICTA

THE SOCIAL PARADOX OF ZONING AND LAND
CONTROLS IN AN EXPANDING URBAN ECONOMY
By

GEORGE L. CREAMER*

The essential condition of modern life is the city; its heartbeat,
the machine; its ultimate characteristic, the population, a vast and
interacting reservoir of labor and absorber of product. The population movement toward Megalopolis is tidal. The desiderate of contemporary life cluster there; the once vital function of rural America is readily performable by constantly smaller population segments; and the economic function of the market town, archetype
of American living only forty years ago, is disappearing. A basic
trend since mid-eighteenth century, such is the thrust and developmental speed of this movement that the United States consists, in
posse, and in twenty years will be in esse, thirty megapolitan centers, each vastly emanating from a core city, aggregately encompassing some 90% of the nation's people.
Presupposing such development, obviously the most valued
asset in such a civilization is megalopolitan land. Economic power
is largely involved in control, use, and dominance of that land.
Human comfort and well-being are intimately dependent upon the
uses made of that land. Of necessity, most human aspirations and
interests in some manner center upon it, and the control and use
of that asset or commodity becomes focal, the center on which bear
the most vital of economico-political forces.
Mr. Jus'ice Brewer once remarked: "The city is a miniature state,
the council is its legislature, the charter is its constitution."1 Justice
Lurton referred to the city as "presumptively the more populous
and better organized community."2 As megalopolitan life develops,
each miniature state strives for preeminence with the state itself,
with zoning the modal base and field of contest.
"Chalcedon was called the city of the blind, because its founders
rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet. The need
for vision of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened
with the years. The dweller within the gates, even more than the
stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness. '3 Thus, even the
most conservative of lawyers and jurists have recognized, putting
the thesis beyond the area of fruitful argument, the basic necessity
for some land use control. "Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase and concentration of
population, problems have developed, and continually are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban
communities."4 Indeed, "regulations, the wisdom, necessity and
validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent
that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half
*
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a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. "5

Only against a backgroundof this kind of general acceptance
of necessity for some land and use controls can we present zoning
problems as they have developed and are present among us. This
article has little utility as a technical legal exposition and is not
proposed as a manual of zoning practice or procedure; technical
matters are covered multipally by texts more complex than useful,
and a plethora of not necessarily reconcilable cases increases daily
at all judicial levels. Rather, it is hoped here to demonstrate the
multiple purposiveness of zoning, its complexity as a theater of
interaction of vital and diverse interests tending in common with
many of our institutions toward the schizophrenic; an area sundered by forces divergently moving and like that fabled messenger,
mounting, to ride rapidly off in all directions.
DICTA usefully allows presentation of these problems because it
is a Colorado publication and because Denver is a megalopolis in
its essentials,-a juvenile megalopolis with those essentials sufficiently at the surface to present symptoms for ready analysis. Megalopolitan growth is a phenomenon of such recency here as to
present a most valuable clinical exhibit.
Zoning as a concept finds its sole justification in the exercise
of the police power, allowable only as it tends to promote public
health, safety, and welfare. As restrictions upon the use of private
property, zoning regulations must be strictly construed. Use of
property for lawful purposes in the discretion of its owner is a
primary constitutional right; restriction is permissible but inhibited,
and allowable only as dictated by the public interest under proper
procedural safeguards. Restriction is not permissible for private or
individual ends, nor in the interest of competing property values.
Neither is restriction allowable on grounds of political utility or
for political convenience.
From these few premises, with which most will probably agree,
germinates and grows the schizophrenic seed. Zoning at base is
"policy." "New policies are usually tentative in their beginnings,
advance in firmness as they advance in acceptance ....

Time may

be necessary to fashion them to precedent customs and conditions." 6
Advance and pace usually, however, are neither undirectional nor
unswerving. If there be uniformity at all, it is the uniformity of a
spiral, reversing as it ascends or advances, a tendency causing the
appearance, when viewed from a static point of vantage, of movement in directions quite opposite from the utlimate end. Policy is
politics, in essence, a variable quantity; "The alternations of our
national mood are such that a cycle of liberal government seldom
exceeds eight years."7 Nor does any other angulation of the spiral
continue without reverse much longer.
Recent Colorado zoning history demonstrates an apparent contradiction in direction and conflict in purpose, characteristics often
besetting the path of precedent-based law. Forty years of zoning
in this state, however, rather clearly indicate the basic direction
5 Id. at 387.
6 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917).
7 Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremnacy 187 (1941).

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER,

1962

DICTA

in which the spiral must proceed, as well as demonstrating the
barriers, interferences, and obstructions latent in that course.
Theoretically, the basis of zoning laws upon the police power
alerts the public immediately to the dangers implicit within the
concept. "The police power.., is the most absolute of the sovereign
powers of the state .... It 'extends to so dealing with the conditions
which exist in a state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of its people.' " "In a sense, the police power is but another name
for the power of government."9 According to Holmes, "police power" is used in a broad sense "to cover

. . .

and . . . to apologize for

the general power of the legislature to make a part of the community uncomfortable by a change." 10
Zoning basically is the instrumentality by which the base power of the state, through the mechanism of the city, is focused upon;
the use of private property, the Arcanum under traditional AngloAmerican legal concepts. "The legal conception of property is of
rights;"'1 a conception of use and enjoyment; "whatever a person
can possess and enjoy by right."'12 Thus, "all that is beneficial in
property arises from its use, and fruits of that use."'1 3 So conceived,
zoning involves a fearful kind of power which must always be held
in balance.
"Property like every other social institution has a social function to fulfill;"'1

4

few will gainsay the hypothesis that "the property

rights to the individual we are to respect, yet we are not to press
them to the point at which they threaten the welfare of the security of the many."' 15
In the working out of regulation, its direction and modality,
calculation of the forces which actuate it cause the difficulty, the
paradox of zoning in an expanding economy. Succinctly stated by
McKenna: "Depart from the simple requirements of law, that
everyone must use his property so as not to injure 6others, and you
pass to refinements and confusing considerations."'
Constitutional literature is largely devoted to a search for a
basis for protection of property, or a justification for its limitation.
That quest epitomizes zoning. Story postulated that "it must always
be a question of the highest moment, how the property-holding
part of the community may be sustained against the inroads of
poverty and vice.' 7 That thesis is basic to constitutional law viewed
as a system of "constitutional limitations" since the Constitution
in large measure is essentially a restriction upon the rapacity of
majorities which, absent such legal barriers, could subject all things
to their desires by force of number alone. In our society, under the
Constitution, differential notions of utility may not be a basis to
deprive one of his property: "One does not lose what is one's own
S Louisville & N.R.R. v. Central Stock Yard Co., 212 U.S. 132, 150 (1909).
'Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell. 222 U.S. 225. 233 (1911).
10 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927).
11 LeRoy Fiber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 350 (1914).
12 Central Poc. R.R. v. Gallatin, 9 Otto (99 U.S.) 700, 738 (1878).
13 Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto (94 U.S.) 113, 141 (1876).
14 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
141 (Hall ed. 1947).
15 Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cordozo 254
(Hall ed. 1947).
16 LeRoy Fiber Co. v. Chicago M. & St. Paul Ry., supro note 11 at 350.
17 Story, Miscellaneous Writings 514 (1835).
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because its utility would be greater if it were awarded to someone
else."' 8
Neither, however, is the property owner wholly free to ignore
basic concepts of utility: "The realization of the benefits of property
must always depend in large degree on the ability and sagacity of
those who employ it."'19 To maximize the value of property, its private owner must
20 be able to "divine in advance the equilibrium of
social desires.
Zoning of Megalopolis treats of the most restricted of commodities, land, possessed of a unique place and valued because of its
unique location in one of the 30-odd foci of American civilization.
Terrible paradoxes result.
Substantial segments of the community seek to restrict the use
of land controlled by other substantial segments who desire to make
use of their properties in a lawful and beneficial manner. These
purposes may, however, make less comfortable living conditions
for others when practiced in a comparatively restricted space. Such
desired restrictions involve one of the most legitimate ends of zoning, but severe abuses and extreme emotional pressures are inherent in them.
Competing users of land, for like and similar purposes, seek to
impose restrictions upon their competitors through zoning laws
legal in form, but tending to the personal benefit and aggrandizement of the movant competitors only. This illustrates an entirely
illegitimate subversion of zoning ends and a practice universally
present in all theaters of zoning operations.
Further, a tendency develops to aggregate in the hands of the
more legislatively favored segment of megalopolitan society the
most esteemed and valued land assets of the society, creating by
virtue of legislative restriction of use a monopoly of a priceless
commodity in the hands of that favored group. This is one of the
most insidious of zoning practices, a perpetually crescent threat
implicit in zoning as it is now practiced.
Finally, there tends to develop, quite apart from the basic concept of "police power" and legitimate protective ends, a substitution
of public officials' notions of land utility value for like notions of
private owners. That is to say, there is a crescent tendency to attempt centralization, through zoning, of control of the economic
18 Golde Clothes Shop, Inc. v. Loena's Buffalo Theaters, Inc., 236 N.Y. 465, 470 (1923).
19 Simpson c. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 458 (1913).
20 Holmes, Speeches 100 (1934).
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activity of the state, represented by the use values of land in Megalopolis, in the hands of a bureaucratic minority which is by no
means necessarily capable of wielding that power. Such bureaucratic subjugation at best tends to strangle and distort economic
development in an expanding economy; at worst, it threatens extinction of that economy in the form in which we know it. This is
the most insidious danger in zoning.
Rights of property are inseparable from rights of personalty,
the basis of our constitutional structure. Property merely represents
the dominance of individual man over his physical environment.
Maximization of Man, as exemplified in the completed individual,
must remain the basic end of a free society. Agglomerative principle, destructive of individual man, must begin his ruin by destroying his control over property.
Local zoning history usefully illustrates the collision of forces
derivative from the sometimes conflicting, but accepted principles
mentioned above, and illuminates the paradoxes. Danger imminent
in any situation, if made explicit, perhaps may be rectified or
avoided.
The growth pattern of Denver was established basically long
prior to the legal concept of zoning. The city is located at the confluence of the Cherry Creek and Platte River, on an alluvial plain
extending easterly and southerly, deposited by those streams and
their predecessors between highlands which are prehistoric river
banks. Early development centered on streets roughly paralleling
the River, principally on Larimer Street, and basically in a southerly-northerly direction.
Historically population movement was south and east. The establishment of the Capitol Building on the east highlands, and palatial
housing developments in the surrounding areas during the gold and
silver booms of the '80's, caused a turning of business development
at a 900 angle, and its movement toward the east-centered residence
areas, particularly along Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth
Streets, and at right angles to the former business centers, up to
Broadway, a north-south thoroughfare faced by the new Capitol
Building.
Early Denver became dependent on a central transportation
system, based on rails, focusing traffic from residential areas into
a business center extending approximately from Broadway on its
east to the old business sections near the river. Development continued from the north-south artery, Broadway, and its intersection
with the east-west artery, Colfax Avenue, at which focus stands
the Capitol.
Until the mid-Twenties of this century, no Denver zoning controls existed, and few building restrictions of any kind were in
effect. In May, 1923, Denver enacted Section 219A of its Charter,
a zoning-enabling act, almost verbatim to that recommended b"
the Department of Commerce, which act became in almost identical
language a state statute, permitting zoning by
towns and cities in
1
addition to the City and County of Denver."
Ordinance 14, Series of 1925, was a zoning ordinance, adhering
to a plan which recognized then existing patterns, including the
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. §60-1 et seq. (1953).
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limited central business district, several classes of business and
commercial districts almost identical as to uses by right and only
slightly more restricted in building dimensions and bulk than the
central area, and extending along principal thoroughfares, certain
industrial districts, and the familiar complex of single family, double-family, and multiple-family dwelling areas.
. The basic validity of that ordinance was early considered in
Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 22 which held that zoning ordinances
act not only negatively but affirmatively for the public welfare,
and basically upheld the concept of zoning, warning specifically,
however, that general validation of the principle did not mean the
court would hesitate to invalidate, on constitutional grounds, particular applications of zoning as adopted.
Much earlier, the Colorado court had laid down basic tenets
as to the right to use land, from which it had seldom departed,
even when sanctioning zoning regulation. More importantly, the
court had held firmly within judicial control all exercise of these
restrictive powers. In City and County of Denver v. Rogers, involving prohibition by Denver, as a nuisance, of any brick yard inside
the City and within 1200 feet of any residence, school, or park, the
court proclaimed reasonableness the key to regulation, a concept
always to be determined by judicial standards: "The general grant
of authority to the city not being, as we have shown, sufficiently
specific and definite to warrant such broad and unrestricted legislation as is contained in this ordinance, its reasonableness, as well
as the question of its constitutionality, become proper matters for
consideration. '23 The ordinance was voided as "manifestly radical,
unjust and oppressive" and as tending to destroy property without
due process.
When the Denver City Council, prior to formal zoning ordinances, refused to permit a home for Negro aged and orphans, our
court, in City and County of Denver v. United Negroes Protective
Association, held that such Councils "are not beyond the control
of the courts when, as here, by the findings of the trial court,
they
' 24
have grossly abused that discretion or acted arbitrarily.
Though the City had hailed Colby v. Board2i- as a charter granting the municipality limitless power to restrict, it became apparent
in Hedgcock v. People, that such boundless discretion was not intended. The action involved desired business use of property abutting on a street zoned as residential, which growth of the City
had made arterial and business in nature. Residential use of
the property restricted the land to $350.00 value, while business
use permitted realization of some $3,500.00. The court held that a
zoning declaration, contrary to the actuality of principal use, was
void: "The clear inference from their testimony is that prior to the
adoption of the zoning ordinance the block referred to was a business center and was continued so, and that it ought never to have
been zoned otherwise.

' 26

Accordingly, rezoning was a denial of use

of the property, unconstitutional and invalid legislation, "because
22 81 Colo. 344, 255 Poc. 443 (1927).
23 46 Colo. 479, 104 Pac. 1042, 25 LRA (NS) 247 (1909).
24 76 Colo. 86, 230 Poc. 598 (1924).
25 Supra note 22.

26 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
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the zoning in question was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional in that it unnecessarily and arbitrarily limited the use of
a certain parcel of property for a purpose that was not justified
under the admitted and determined facts and circumstances. '27
Arbitrary regulation in defiance of existing economic facts, is
prohibited, as is the continuation of restrictions under circumstances in which economic change has made the restrictions inapplicable. People ex rel. Friedman v. Weber, involving the introduction of business on Colorado Boulevard, an arterial street once
residential, and wholly changed in character by developing use,
states: "It is scarcely disputed that Tract A is practically valueless
for residential purposes but of very considerable value for commercial use and this conclusion is inescapable from the admitted
facts regardless of expert testimony .... Our conclusion is that the

zoning of Tract 8A is contrary to the Charter amendment, confisca2
tory, and void."
Moreover, restrictions must be interpreted in such manner as
to allow projected use, rather than prohibit it. In People ex rel.
Grommon v. Hedgcock, a building permit was refused a bungalow
court in a business district upon the claim that a special section of
the then zoning ordinance required special permission for construction of "automobile tourist camps." That phenomenon was not defined in the ordinance, and the court declined permission to limit
use of the land:
Until the legislative agency defines and prohibits such
camps, there is, in our opinion, no legal basis-the alleged
basis being too doubtful-under which one may be deprived of a legitimate use of property without violating
constitutional guarantees in that respect. The police power,
which is the legal basis for zoning legislation, must constantly be reconciled with the legitimate use
of private
property, in harmony with such guaranties. 29
Despite such declarations, Denver continued to assert, in essence, that the right to use land derived from legislative authority,
refusing to recognize that restriction upon use is abnormal, requiring demonstration of right and necessity. That theory was succinctly30 and unequivocally rejected in Jones v. Board of Adjustment:
We consider briefly some basic fundamentals. The right
to the use and enjoyment of property for lawful purposes
is the very essence of the incentive to property ownership
The right to thus use property is a property right fully
protected by the due process clause of the Federal and
State constitutions The use to which an owner may put his
property is subject to a proper exercise of the police power.
The so-called police power is the authority under which
zoning ordinances have been universally upheld. In every
ordered society the state must act as umpire to the extent
of preventing one man from so using his property as to prevent others from making a corresponding full and free use
27 Id. at 528.
28 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 183 (1942).
29 106 Colo. 300, 104 P.2d 607 (1940).
30 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
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of their property. Thus, under the police power, zoning
ordinances are upheld imposing limitations upon the use
of land, provided, however, that the regulations are reasonable and provided, further, that their restrictions in
fact have substantial relation to the public health, safety,
or general welfare. 31
The basic problem involved definitions, specifically the word "office." It was held that interpretation of the ordinance required a
meaning favorable to the unrestricted use of property.
It is judicially recognized that as economic growth takes place
within a community, restrictions once utile and significant become
31 Id. at 427.
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inapplicable, and change of use, as from residential to commercial,
must be permitted. Bohn v. Board of Adjustment of Denver recognizes that "It is a fundamental principle recognized by all the authorities that any regulation or restriction upon that use of property which bears no relation to public safety, health, morals or
general welfare, cannot be sustained as a proper exercise of the
police power of the municipality. 3 2 Zoning must change as the
character of a neighborhood changes, since status too much prolonged can lead to decay:
Now that West Colfax Avenue has become a cross-country
artery and, as determined by the Board, is lined with business and commercial uses, the character of this territory,
where Relator desires to build, has changed with the passage of time, the action of the Board, and the tacit assent
of adjacent property owners. What at one time may have
been considered residential property now has been devoted to business and commercial uses. It is very apparent
from this record that the action of the Board in the instant
case was arbitrary and capricious and will not stand the
test set forth in Hedgcock v. People ex rel .... 33
At the end of World War II, the Denver area greatly increased
in population and general economic activity. Pent-up demand
caused development of vast housing areas outside the bound of
previous urbanization. In parallel with most metropolitan centers,
there occurred a shift from a centralized city, dependent on mass
transport to a central business district, to widely dispersed living,
under semi-suburban conditions, made possible by diffuse automotive transport.
In Megalopolis, the "core city" must diminish in relative economic importance. In Denver that happened. Historic population
movement south and east was accelerated over the plains by reason
of building convenience and ease of utilities installation. Population moved so rapidly and so far south and east that the epi-center
of the metropolitan area no longer occurred in the "Down Town"
central business district centering at Colfax and Broadway, but lay
three miles east and two and one-half miles south, near the intersection of Colorado Boulevard with Cherry Creek.
Highways were now the important links, not railway lines.
However, though the "Down Town" area was no longer central in
economic fact, it remained so in politico-economic influence. The
concept of a centralized business district, based on heavy foot traffic and moved by street railway into the central area, was no longer
valid. Strong impetus existed for the development for commercial
purposes of the "shopping center," -the dispersed commercial area,
varying in size from the purely local store cluster centering in a
housing development to the "regional shopping center" aggregating
scores of stores and serving vast population segments.
Intense economic rivalry developed between interests primarily
centered upon outlying and rapidly developing regions, and those
centered in the established, but relatively static central area. Corn:12 129 Colo. 539, 271 P.2d 1051 (1954).
3:3Id. at 544.
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mercial and industrial activities followed retail trade toward decentralization, as new techniques made necessary vastly increased
single-floor areas for warehousing of goods, rendering obsolete entire sections of warehouse facilities downtown; as manufacturing
occupied new and enormous sites on the periphery of the city; and
as subsidiary processing followed major facilities to the city's edge.
By Ordinance 16, Series of 1955, the City embarked on dangerous zoning expedients. Developed for thirty-one years on the 1925
pattern, recognizing the structural economics of the city as of its
adoption, Denver had followed some uniform pattern of growth.
The 1955 ordinance essayed a kind of zoning revolution, arbitrarily
and radically reducing the amount of land available for non-residential purposes, placing capricious restrictions upon lands permitted business and commercial use outside the central business
district, and imposing ruthless restrictions upon the size and bulk
of buildings outside the central area. Regulation was atempted
in the sole interest of the Central Business District, attempting to
render competing activities subservient by providing for vast land
requirements for "off street parking," sometimes equivalent to four
time utilizable area, but not required at all in the Central Business
District.
Peripheral business districts were recognized as to use, but
specifically declared to be servient areas, tributary to the Central
District, restricted as to parking requirements, building bulk, and
the like in order to render competition with the Central Business
Distiict impotdnt.
Most immediately the impact of the ordinance was felt by the
Broadway aiea, adjacent to the Central Business District, an area
severely affected by the newly established differentiation and by
provisions purporting to declare improper many traditional and
established uses in the area, seeking to root them out by a system
of proclaimed non-conformity and required registration of use.
The result was the first of the so-called Denver Buick cases, instituted as No. B-8071 in the Denver District Court, in which, upon
procedural due process grounds, the 1955 ordinance
was wholly
34
voided. The supreme court affirmed that voidance.
Dramatically paralleling the court actions to void the ordinance,
the Denver Council engaged in passage, under different notice
forms and more careful adherence to charter procedures, the identical ordinance the court was voiding. As the court sat upon the
1955 ordinance there was introduced Councilman's Bill 403, Series
of 1956, enacted on November 5, 1956, as Ordinance 392, Series of
1956.
Immediate court action followed in the Denver District Court-35
assailing the re-passed ordinance on varied procedural and substantive grounds. The ordinance was invalidated upon the finding
that it ignored substantially all economic reality and was violently
discriminatory.
Seldom has legislation been so clearly motivated by the desire
of an entrenched economic interest and its supporters to thwart
34 136 Colo. 482, 319 P.2d 490 (1957).
35 Denver

B13644.
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economic competition by preventing land uses by others. It is indeed
a curious phenomenon of modern economics, in land use and otherwise, that the course of those most violently opposed to private
rights in property and the course of the most vociferous advocates
of laissez-faire run directly parallel. The land monopolist buttresses
his depredations with cries of "economic freedom," while those who
advocate unrestricted public control tend to support that course,
since aggregation in limited hands, monopoly and oligopoly, make
eventually easier the task of monopoly in the state or total confiscation of that property. The more limitedly property is held in
control, the more readily that control will pass from private hands
into the state. Modern zoning, thus subject to abuse, leads unquestionably to the monopoly state, and if protracted must lead to total
public control of the megalopolitan land resource.
Curiously, no one appeared, as shown by council and court
records, to support the zoning measure in council. Substantial objections were made, but the measure unanimously passed, even
though the courts were voiding its earlier version, and despite the
monitions available in extensive precedent litigation.
After a trial of weeks' duration, the District Court rendered
an extensive written opinion. It discussed attempted differentiation
between the Central Business District and the peripheral, Broadway-centered, business district, referred to in the ordinance as the
B-6 District: "[T] his so-called description of the Business 6 District
so far as it relates to the district itself and the purpose it serves is
totally in error and without foundation of fact. '36 The court pointed
out that "both business districts contain businesses and buildings
devoted to the same use of right and business as the other. ' 37 The
ordinance, motivated by desire to protect economic interests in the
Central Business District, attempted to render the peripheral district subservient, declaring "this district, at present, is a large area
located immediately adjacent to the B-5 District [Central Business
District] for which it acts as a service area, . . ."3 Of this assertion,
the trial
court said: "This is totally without any foundation in
39
fact.

The court held that differential parking requirements made
imperative devotion of private property to public service and purpose without compensation, in all districts except the favored Central Business District. Those requirements were therefore stricken in
totality, the court finding that the regulation "divides the requirements into a maze of rules and laws which, in reality, make the
owners of the real property therein the pawns and victims of the
with oppressive requireDepartment of Zoning Administration,
40
ments, as the court will point out.

This ordinance, designed to advance private interests, was condemned in language perhaps as strong as any ever judicially used
in Colorado:
The ordinance as to the description and motive for the
zoning and off-street parking regulations is the most un36 Id. at 17.
37 Id. at 18.

38 Id. at 19.
39 Ibid.

40 Id. at 20.
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realistic document ever enacted by a law-making body, as
relates to the B-5 and B-6 Districts. And thereby a segment
of the business property in the City and County of Denver is
strangled with a phony description of the district which
could never have been written nor authorized by a person
living in Denver, let alone by any member of the City
Council who 41can or might look out of the Council Chamber windows.

Attempted discrimination was total: strangulation by misdefinition; attempted imposition of subservient status; differential
parking treatment of areas directly and prospectively competitive;
and finally an attempt to require registration of land use, ultimately
to exclude as non-conforming thousands of individual uses, retroactively to the date of the voided Ordinance 16, Series of 1955.
Those attempts at regimentation and retroactivity the court also
voided, it being held that "the power to prohibit lawful enterprise,
and the use of one's property was never the intent of the people in
adopting the zoning amendment to the Charter, nor will it permit
uncontrolled regulations and dictatorial powers of commercial and
industrial enterprise, such as set forth . . .-42 in the registration
and non-conforming use sections of the enactment.
The supreme court affirmed that opinion, and extensively
quoted from it in the second Denver Buick case. 43 District differentials were entirely put down; off-street parking provisions were
wholly voided; and the court found that under applicable Charter
provisions, the Council could not require landowners who had
theretofore used property for permitted purposes to register the
same as non-conforming, to submit reports thereon, to encumber
their titles, or to run the risk of loss of right to the use of their
properties. Extension of uses, change in rental patterns, and repair,
extension, and alteration of structure could not be prohibited. The
44
court later adhered to its opinion in Denver v. Redding-Miller, Inc.
The Denver Buick cases illustrate two of the most violent of the
paradoxes of modern zoning. First, zoning is susceptible of terrible
politico-economic destortion, the result of conscious effort, as specifically held in the cases, to favor one segment of the community
over another and to vest in that favored segment the power potent
41 Id.

at 24.

42 Id. at 33
43 City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959).
44 141 Colo. 269, 347 P.2d 954 (1959).
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in monopolies, control over business-commercial land uses in Megalopolis. Second, the cases demonstrate the danger of legislation,
fostered by bureaucracy in the city, the little state, which "divides
the requirements into a maze of rules and laws which, in reality,
make the owner of real property therein the pawns and victims of"
the administrative bodies involved. These abuses never end, but
have found protraction even in privately and bureaucratically inspired attempts directly to legislate against judicially determined
fact.
It is constitutionally clear in Colorado that no one holds or uses
his property at the sufferance of his neighbor and that legislation
tending to restrict use of property solely for the advantage of a
neighbor or competitor is void.
These principles were early set forth in Curran v. Denver,
voiding an ordinance which made use of one person's property
dependent upon consent of his neighbor, because "it commits, in
some instances, the exercise of the municipality's legislative discretion to property owners and residents, and in others, entrusts such
power to the caprice of certain of its officers, and vests in them
or revoke the right
an absolute or despotic power to grant, refuse
45
to carry on an ordinary, legitimate business.
The Curran case was followed by Willison v. Cooke, in which it
was held that:
[I] t is a fundamental law, that a municipality under our
system of government may, by ordinance, require the owner
of a lot to so use it that the public health and safety will
be best conserved, and to this end its police power may be
exercised; but it is also fundamental, that such owner has
the right to erect such buildings covering such portions
thereof as he chooses, and put his property, as thus improved, to any legitimate use which suits his pleasure,
so doing he does not imperil or threaten
provided that in
46
harm to others.

In that same Willison case it is further said:
Legislative restrictions upon the use of property can only
be imposed upon the assumption that they are necessary
for the health, comfort or general welfare of the public;
and any law abridging rights to use of property which does
not infringe the right of others, or which limits the use
of property beyond what is necessary to provide for the
welfare and general security of the public cannot be in47
cluded in the police power of a municipal government.
Fortunately, rights of property owners are not fundamentally
subject to the legislative body, but are specifically a matter 'for the
courts:
Police regulations, in order to be valid, must tend to accomplish a legitimate public purpose; that is, such regulations must have a substantial relation to the public objects
which government may legally accomplish; and while it is
for the legislative department of a municipality to deter45 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
46 54 Colo. 320, 326, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
47 Id. at 326-27.
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mine the occasion for the exercise of its police power, it is
clearly within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine the
reasonableness of that exercise, when, as in the case at bar,
it assumes that power
by virtue of its incidental or a general
48
grant of authority.
Accordingly, the consent of adjacent property owners to the
construction of a store building was unnecessary:
These regulations do not, in the slightest degree, have any
relation whatever to the health, safety, or general welfare
of the public, nor do they tend, in any sense, to accomplish
anything for the benefit of the public in this respect, but
merely attempt to limit the petitioner in a use of his property, which does not infringe upon the rights of others.
This deprives him of the fundamental right to erect a store
building upon his lots covering such portions thereof as he
chooses, although, by so doing, he does not imperil or
threaten injury to others of which they can lawfully complain. 49

The Curranand Willison cases, old though they are, and antecedent to zoning though they may be, find specific approval of the
court in the recent Denver Buick decisions.
That court, moreover, has made crystal clear its disapproval of
the attempts of economic competitors to limit by zoning the uses of
land. Westwood Meat Markets, Inc. v. McLucas5 0° involving an injunction by a competing market sought against zoning allowing construction of shopping center facilities, stated that zoning can be
justfied only as a proper exercise of the police power, and that
owners and lessees of commercial property distant from the subject
property and of the same type as zoning authorized upon the
subject, were not, as competitors, "aggrieved persons" entitled to
attack or question zoning. Nothing, indeed, is more pernicious than
the notion that a competitor may frustrate, by frustrating zoning,
he development of economic competition.
Modern zoning is pregnant with and implicitly contains monopoly. So-called governmental "planning" accepts as a basic hypothesis that commercial and business land must exist in large, dense
aggregates, and in limited locations. That planning accepts as an
article of faith the concentrated "shopping center," the "industrial
park," and the particular concentration of all retail, commercial, and
business activity within ever narrower bounds. Such centers are, as
land investments, in point of building capital required to institute
and operate them, complex economic enterprises.
Small, local, and independent retail merchants cannot hope to
possess their own land or building resources, for zoning limits available lands, and drives toward tenant status the local proprietor.
The "center," however, rejects that tendency because, by reason of
the vast sums necessarily invested in it, it is itself dependent for
financing upon exterior means, institutional sources interested in
"quality of tenancy," the certainty of rent collection. It is hypothe48 Id. at 327-28.
49 Id. at 328-29.
50 146 Colo. 435, 361 P.2d 776 (1961).
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sized that any national operation, any substantial commercial chain,
any potential or actual monopoly or oligopoly, is preferable in
essence as a commercial risk to any individual or local merchant.
Prime space in prime and scarce commercial land facilities, then,
must be given to non-local operations, tending to the monopolization of commercial and economic activity generally in fewer and
ever fewer hands.
Justice Story said the "monopoly" as understood in law, "is an
exclusive right granted to a few of something which was before
of common right. '51 It follows necessarily that "the granting of monopolies, or exclusive privileges to individuals or corporations, is
an invasion of the right of others to
52 choose a lawful calling, and
an infringement of personal liberty.
"Nor is it for the substantial interests of the country that any
one commodity should be within the sole power and subject to the
sole will of one powerful combination of capital," 53 for the simple
reason that, as observed by Justice Brandeis, "human nature is such
that monopolies, however well intentioned, and however well regulated, inevitably become, in the course of time, oppressive, arbitrary,
unprogressive, and inefficient,"5 4 which is but another mode of
phrasing Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely.
Megalopolitan land is limited. Zoning limits still further the
highly productive part thereof, commercial and business land. Economics of building finance restrict holdings of land and its use still
further. Zoning is thus potentially capable of terrible abuse, and
Denver has seen in the last six years that abuse in potent action.
Zoning in this community has been made the prime instrument in
advancement of selfish personal interests of a limited community
segment. Our courts have wisely thwarted that attempt. The attempt, however, will continue unabated.
It is one of the paradoxes of zoning, also, that the emotional
overtones raised by the word in the public mind are such that the
residential landowner, interested in limiting incursions against his
own uses, forgets that all coins have a reverse, and that the restrictions for which he sometimes clamours may tend toward monopoly
and the eventual strangulation and death of Megalopolis itself. The
"Great City," the metropolitan area, can develop only if development is reasonably free. If trammelled unduly, then surely the
community, like a body without circulation, will die. It is healthful,
therefore, that recent Colorado decisions limit the direct right of a
competitor to use zoning objections as a device to thwart and stifle
competition.
There is, however, and courts recognize, a rightful area within
which property owners may be heard to protest. This area involves
primarily protection of developed private residential property
55
against unwarranted commercial intrusion. Westwood Markets

specifically recognizes the right of residential property owners,
51
52
53
54
55

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872).
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri F. Association, 166 U.S. 290, 324 (1896).
Brandeis, A Free Man's Life 181 (1946).
Supra note 40.
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which is explored at considerable length by the court in Holly
Development, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners.5 6 The Colorado court has indicated that it will protect established residential
districts against business incursion, commercial or other use, absent
the strongest showing of changed circumstances, which is essentially
as it should be.
Clark v.. City of Boulder5 7 points out that residential property
owners may rely on existing zoning conditions, where there has
been no material change in the character of the neighborhood requiring re-zoning in the public interest. Specifically, the court
refused re-zoning of a service station site proximate to a residential
area. In such limited circumstances, property so proximate to a
residential zone, though more profitably usable for commercial than
residential purposes, may not be accorded special treatment by rezoning. In the circumstances of the case, the rule appears reasonable,
but it does constitute a repudiation of the basic constitutional
principle that change of condition such as to make property limitedly usable for the purpose originally zoned, and much more suitable
for another purpose, may compel re-zoning as an alternative to
confiscation.
Those who consider zoning a panacea for all ills look for radical
departures in each new zoning case. Colorado does not tend toward
radical departures in zoning. Zoning is a permitted area of legislation, the weaknesses, dangers and paradoxes implicit in which, our
court has clearly recognized, comprehended, and delineated. As in
other areas of law, zoning decisions are made upon the circumstances of a case. Trends and tendencies in this state remain clear,
and the court has been chary of approval of radical zoning changes
if the fact of excess has been made clear.
Clark v. Boulder demonstrates that the allowance of commercial
zoning in an area theretofore residential is based on the furtherance
of some comprehensive scheme or plan designed in accordance with
the public policy bases which underlie zoning. If so predicated, the
change is allowable, and if made simply to relieve a particular tract
from restriction, it is not permissible. Forwarding of a rational design is favored, but aggrandizement of an individual plot, to the
detriment of its surroundings, is improper. A rather similar rule is
announced in Frankel v. Denver."8
56 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959).
57 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961).
58 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
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Baum v. Denver,59 like the Frankel case, holds that disparity in
values for one use as against another does not control in the determination of the validity of zoning ordinances. So stated, the principle may not be the ground for quarrel. The Baum case, however,
on its facts appears well outside the current of Colorado authority,
and in its fact setting probably represents a situation ideally illustrative of one of the paradoxes we here study.
That case involves the re-zoning of a substantial tract of land,
fronting on Sheridan Boulevard, an arterial highway which is also
the county lines separating Denver and Jefferson Counties. Denver
attempted residential zoning on segments of land along the thoroughfare; Jefferson County zoning is primarily business and commercial, abutting across the street. Traffic is very high, the Boulevard being one of the half dozen most travelled streets in Megalopolis.
The automobile is a great maker of zoning and the prime
former of land values in Megalopolis. Where automobiles travel,
commercial uses follow. Commercial value inheres in land primarily
because of the habit of persons to foregather there, or because of
the number of persons, capable of entry, who pass the particular
location. Exterior effects of the automobile and of much-travelled
streets are such as limit use of property on those streets for residence purposes.
Such a main travelled street, given proper multi-directional
approaches and debouchements, will become in time commercial
or business in nature, once any business incursion is allowed. This
is manifest in Denver. Though zoning restrictions were imposed to
prevent it, East Colfax Avenue, West Colfax Avenue, and Colorado
Boulevard have successively become entirely commercial thoroughfares, becoming so in a short period after entry of the first commercial uses, and transformed from areas once almost wholly residential in character. City planners deplore those developments.
Finding catch-all phrases useful, they stigmatize the development as
"strip zoning." They stigmatize, in essence, a development inevitable
in the automotive age, the commercialization of the heavilytravelled area, the foregathering of business where the people are.
The solution of the planner is "development in depth," that is,
zoning of large tracts, at scattered intervals, for commercial purposes, while attempting to maintain the arterial frontages for residential or multi-family uses.
"Development in depth" is a necessary prelude to land monopoly, as discussed above, and the arterial frontage is inutile for housing in most cases.
If large tracts bound a highway, residential uses are possible.
Otherwise, retention of arterial strips, bounding main-travelled
roads, for single-family residence use is visionary. No one who can
remove himself from the influence of really concentrated automotive traffic, will voluntarily remain in residence proximate to it,
unless in tracts of such size as to permit effective depth screening.
The almost universally posited suggestion of the planner that mulitple dwellings replace the single-family unit foolishly ignores the
fact that the same objections which make the area noxious to an in59 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
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dividual house-holder will be no more palatable to an apartment
dweller, particularly because only seldom does development make
possible siting on lots sufficiently deep to offset the traffic effect.
Resultantly, arterial streets open to business, usually by court
action, and once opened become commercial in time. Colorado Boulevard admirably demonstrates the point. In a procedurally intricate
litigation, called the Davidson Chevrolet cases, 60 the Boulevard
was commercially opened, an inevitable result upon the failure of
Denver to eliminate the heavy commercial concentrations permitted
in the freely zoned Town of Glendale. Contrary to the desires of
the planners, and certainly in violent opposition to the wishes of
the central land monopolists, South Colorado Boulevard has developed, on a periphery, as the primarily growing commercial area
of Denver, inevitable because it is the geographic center of Megalopolis, and one free from artificial zoning restraints.
Prolongation of severely restrictive zoning, indeed, may seriously imperil all zoning in an area. If deterioration of a residential
area begins, residence in the area becomes undesirable. If the land
is not freed immediately for higher use, and made salable at reasonable prices for that use, there is an open invitation sent forth to
urban blight. Immediate recognition of the problem, and limited
relaxation of zoning, as occurred in Denver on South Colorado
Boulevard and in parts of the Cherry Creek area, make possible
permanent retention of high-grade residence areas, screened and
protected by walls of high-grade commercial use fronting arterial
thoroughfares. Failure of timely relaxation, or total abdication of
control, cause those blight conditions manifest in the north part of
Colorado Boulevard, still rigidly controlled, and such blight spreads.
Urban blight is most effectively combatted by early zoning for
uses sufficiently productive in nature to permit destruction of
blightable improvements before the disease occurs or spreads. The
principle is simple. It is almost never recognized, and even less
often implemented-another zoning paradox.
Preservation of the residential community is the great strength
and the principal justification of zoning. The residential community
and the single residential proprietor, however, often essay more
than may be permissibly accomplished in the name of zoning. Such
excesses are not judicially allowed. Nelson v. Farr,61 a Greeley case,
is illustrative. Land was annexed to Greeley under a plat showing
blanket residential restrictions on lots in the annexed area. The
owner retained undeveloped tracts for business and commercial purposes. The retained tract, when subsequently annexed to Greeley,
was zoned for commercial uses. A trial court, persuaded by the
residents to enjoin zoning, attempted to impose on the lands the
burdens of the restrictive covenants limiting previously annexed
lands to residential use. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the
limitation and held that a restrictive covenant could not extend by
judicial action to lands not covered by covenant or contract, that
there was no right to impose such a covenant not referential to
specific lands, by requiring zoning limitations parallel to the cove60 137 Colo. 575, 328 P.2d 377 (1958); 138 Colo. 171, 330 P.2d 1116 (1958).
61 143 Colo. 423, 354 P.2d 163 (1960).
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nant. The case appears proper on its facts, recognizing upon annexation that the land annexed was as free for development as prior to
annexation.
Annexation itself, however, presents severe zoning paradoxes.
Zoning power inheres both in County Commissioners, who often
exercise it county-wide, and have done so in Megalopolis, in the
Tri-Counties surrounding Denver, and a like power is granted municipal authorities, who have exercised that power within their corporate limits. It is often sought to alter established County zoning,
and to alter established County plans, by annexing land to a municipality. Practically no change of circumstances is accomplished by
translation of municipal boundaries across a street, particularly in
Megalopolis, where city lines often afford no real differentiation
even in degree of urbanization, and annexation is most often only a
pretext for zoning, political and developmental gerrymanders.
These attempts to break established zoning by the juggling of
municipal boundaries are of common occurrence in Megalopolitan
areas. Colorado has not yet appellately decided the cases involving
such problems, though one such case has been much litigated and
determined at nisi prius.62 An attempt to alter county-imposed residential zoning, on property in a substantially developedt residential
area, to permit commercial zoning by the annexing Ci y of Englewood, was, in that case, disallowed.
The Colorado court has been willing to protect established residential uses. It has not, however, been willing to allow militant use
of zoning by residents against other uses. The City of Englewood
by ordinance barred churches of all kinds from single and double
family residence areas, except as an act of grace, through its Board
of Adjustment. "[R] eligious and educational institutions," including churches and places of worship, were permitted as "conditional
uses, provided the public interest
is fully protected and . . . uses
6'3
are approved by the board. 1

Land in a residen'ial district was given the Apostolic Christian
Church by a parishioner for the purpose of construction of a church
building. Plans were presented to the Board of Adjustment showing
conformance to building regulations and demonstrating adequate
parking. Numerous objections were filed by residents, protesting
that occupancy of their homes would be disturbed by traffic engendered by the church, sound originating during services, and the
like.
The Board of Adjustment refused permission to build and action
was commenced to compel issuance of permits. The District Court
voided the ordinance as contrary to due process requirements, holding that vestiture of discretion in the Board, without standards, was
void, and ordered permits granted. The supreme court 64 unanimously

affirmed the lower court, the majority doing so on the basis that a
church might not upon constitutional principle be excluded from
any zone district, existing as a use by right in any district. Blanket
exclusion, the ccurt ruled, did not further the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare of the community. A zoning ordinance providing
62 Deuth v. City of Englewood, Dist. Ct. Arapohoe County, CivilAction No. 16736.
63 See note 64 infra at 375.
64 City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172 (1961).
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such exclusion was invalid under due process provisions both of
Article 2, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In a specially concurring view, a minority of the court limited
concurrence to impropriety of delegation of discretion, substantially
without standards, and to the fact that abuse of discretion had
occurred.
The majority rule is consonant with that generally adopted in
the United States: "Churches and accessory uses are generally permitted in districts zoned for residential use. In districts where
churches are permitted, a parish house, school, or convent used in
connection therewith is allowed as an accessory or appurtenant
thereto." 65 The author quotes Basset on Zoning, page 200, to like
effect:
Practically all zoning ordinances allow churches in all residence districts .... It would be unreasonable to force them
into business districts where there is noise and where land
values are high, or into dense residence districts (in cities
which have established several kinds of such districts.)
Some people claim that numerous churchgoers crowd the
street, that their automobiles line the curbs, and that music
and preaching disturb the neighbors. Communities that are
too sensitive to welcome churches should protect themselves by private restrictions.
Substantially all states, except California, which adopts a most
eccentric and unjustifiable rule,66 follow the quoted doctrine.
Clearly, the attempted exclusions have nothing to do with
public health, safety, and welfare in the zoning sense. Manifestly
churches, schools, and similar institutions are essentials of residential communities in a civilization like ours. Such functions, modal
to the life of the community, must occur where the community
lives. Worship and education cannot be excluded from a residence
district, no matter how sensitive.
The majority opinion in the Apostolic Christian Church case
reiterates strongly the basic precepts of the ownership right to
determine uses of property and emphasizes as well that zoning is
based wholly on public health, safety, and welfare and the restric65 Rathkopf, Zoning 259 (1956).
66 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of
Portersville, 90 Cal. App. 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949).
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tions necessary to the preservation thereof, but it is not based on
aesthetic considerations.
The tendency is to develop around Megalopolis a closed community, using municipal authority to buttress its own limited opinions, and to exclude agencies of expression of opinion by others.
Zoning has no such purpose. There is no basis for such exclusion
of ideas upon the predicate of law. Communities so sensitive must
look not to zoning but to private covenant.
Several such isolationist communities have sought to exclude
not only churches, but even schools,67 an essay apparently well
outside the zoning powers, not only by reason of Apostolic Christian
Church, but also under the doctrine announced in Reber v. South
Lakewood Sanitation Dist.,"" where the court held that the Sanitation District, in location of its facilities, was neither governed nor
governable by a county zoning resolution. That decision indicates
that governmental authority may not be amenable at all to zoning
regulations in the location and construction of public facilities, a
rule broadly adopted in many jurisdictions.
Balance appears manifest in these decisions. Pressure of residential groups may not overwhelm judicial judgment as to the
propriety of zoning restrictions. "Judicial judgment" must underlie
and be the predicate of all zoning. Here lies another paradox. Under
all applicable zoning statutes, before zoning may be instituted or,
after institution, before it may be varied or changed there must be
public hearings. Decisions such as the Holly Development case,69
earlier discussed, require a judicial standard of conduct by the legislative body, making its decisions in zoning matters reviewable
by certiorari. From an early date the court has held that propriety
of zoning restrictions presented essentially judicial questions, to be
judicially reviewed. The courts, however, declare further that they
must refrain from "zoning," and that the legislative determination,
in areas definable as discretionary, must not be readily impeded.
Here a great weakness exists. Few who have observed zoning
hearings before legislative bodies or planning commissions can but
have noticed a fearful sameness in those hearings, a discussion either
perfunctory or essentially emotional, in an atmosphere pressed and
stressed and not conducive to the deriving of information from the
hearing process. Legislative bodies by their very nature are not
constructed to hear and determine cases. Hearings must be either
idle gestures, or since witnesses cannot properly testify or be examined, become a catch-as-catch-can debate, upon a predicate of emotion-all useless as a determinant of land use problems.
The volume of such work makes its legislative handling impracticable. In Denver alone, 300-odd ordinances annually deal with
zoning or map changes, which necessitates the requisite amount of
time in council procedures.
The legislature thus usually attempts to exclude the peteitioner
from the council by a cumbersome process of administrative regulation, as in Denver, coupled with an almost Elizabethan secrecy of
administrative procedure, or by a too .rapid processing of vital matters by council or commission, as in other parts of Megalopolis.
67 Town of Greenwood Village, Colorado, Ordinances.
68 362 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1961).
69 Supra note 45.
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Necessary development clearly requires special tribunals to
hear zoning questions, and an orderly procedure and genuine record,
reviewable and required to be reviewed by a court of law. Zoning.
should certainly not be handled in a manner less formal than public
utilities or those cases within cognizance of an Industrial Commission. Neither the bureaucratic approach nor the log-jammed legislative one is basically workable.
Multiplicity of agencies often clouds administration of zoning
ma t ters. By statute, zoning power is fundamentally vested in
legislative bodies, councils in the municipalities, and County Commissioners in the counties, with compulsory reference to planning
commissions for advisory opinions. Those planning commissions
exist at the local municipal level, at the county level, at interregional levels, and, in certain aspects, at the state level. Each body
deems dear its prerogative of hearing and consultation, and these
often quadrupled procedures delay the whole process, to the economic detriment of the community.
For the most part appointive and non-salaried, these bodies,
though often composed of persons devoted to performance of difficult duties, allow undesirable local politico-economic influences to
be exerted upon private matters of business and property management. In their interactions and confluence, the multiple agencies
probably tend to confuse and impede, another paradox of zoning in
Megalopolis.
In conclusion, it may be posited that zoning is and will remain
with us as a possible method of protection of the public interest,
whatever that may be, in property use in the metropolitan area;
that the mechanism of zoning is one which has implicit within it
considerable utility as a limited protective device, and substantial
possibility and likelihood of abuse, both at the hands of the land
monopolist, and municipal bureaucrat, and the over-protective; that
the mechanism must always be subject to rigid control in the courts,
and that so controlled, it may perhaps serve as a braking mechanism
against too precipitate a change in land use. It is unlikely, however,
as a practical matter, that zoning legislation will ever primarily
determine land use, direct it, or form a fundamental basis for it.
The dynamics of a community, so long as that community remains
economically free, dictate the uses to which land will inevitably
gravitate, whatever expedient of zoning be employed.
Zoning otherwise employed than as a braking mechanism is
probably misapplied, and, historically, is probably futile. Zoning,
misapplied, as is obviously possible, and in this community actual,
can be deadly to the growth of the community, whose courts must
be ever vigilant against the dangers implicit in this mechanism.
Such abused zoning results in an atmosphere making possible
such dread distortions as the forced seizure of private lands implicit in Urban Renewal, and the gravitation of basic economic
power into public- hands, totally unacceptable as deviant from the
basic postulates of our constitutional scheme.
Like most attempted regulations, introductions of rigidity into
a professedly free society, zoning and land controls in Megalopolis
are in their essence paradoxical.
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URBAN RENEWAL -A PARTNERSHIP OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INTERESTS FOR URBAN BETTERMENT
By

MAXINE KURTZ*

Classical real estate theory predicates the existence of cyclical
development and redevelopment of a free market in urban land.
When the demand is sufficient, the vacant land will be improved
with the private construction of buildings. As time passes, the investment in the buildings will be realized, and the value of the
property (including the buildings) will fall below the value of the
land in a vacant state. Theoretically, income will similarly fall,
and eventually, the costs (taxes, insurance, maintenance) will exceed the return, and the building will be demolished. The land will
then be available for new private construction when the demand
arises. In many instances, this theory works in practice.
There can be, however, major roadblocks to the practical operation of this theory. The demand may be overestimated, as happened in Miami and in Chicago, two spectacular past examples.
Thus, land is platted, utilities and other improvements are installed, and a few scattered buildings are constructed. Then the
speculative bubble bursts, and the land becomes paralyzed. Some
of the sites are abandoned by the owners and revert to the public
on tax foreclosures. Ownership of the remaining sites becomes
scattered among hundreds of owners all over the world.
Another major roadblock may be improper zoning. Prior to and
during World War II, Denver suffered from a shortage of land
where apartment construction was permitted. This resulted in
"boot-leg" basement apartments springing up all over the city,
while normal construction of standard apartments was suppressed.
Another example dating from about the same period was a sudden
increase in the demand for offices and clinics in the vicinity of our
major hospitals, caused by the changing technology of medical
practice. This demand for land development .was held down for a
number of years by prohibitive zoning in the desired areas.
A third major impediment to normal recycling of the physical
plant of a community is what might be termed "milking" of slum
properties. This consists of the owners of such properties purchasing them for a minimum price, making no repairs on them, overcrowding the premises with tenants (many on public welfare), enjoying minimal real estate tax rates because the structures have
been depreciated by the assessor, and collecting rents which make
such investments among the most stable and profitable in the
modern money market. As a result of this combination of factors,
these properties are not being demolished as hypothesized in the
real estate theory stated at the head of this article.
Social reformers have been calling attention to this problem
since the turn of the century. Such names as Jacob Riis, Lincoln
Steffans, and Jane Addams were prominent in this movement. In* Head

of the planning research division of the Denver Planning Office.
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terest has not abated, as witness the recent series of articles on
slum housing in Denver appearing in the Denver Post,' and the
analysis of the effect of the money market policies on the rehabilitation of marginal areas, appearing in the Reporter magazine a
year ago. 2 Housing codes, zoning ordinances, building codes, and
capital improvement budgets based on comprehensive plans were
among the tools which were developed in response to the needs
pointed out by the early reformers.Heralded by President Franklin Roosevelt's challenge to the
country to aid the one-third of the nation which was ill-fed, illclothed and ill-housed,4 the federal government entered the field
of improvement of urban communities in the mid-1930's. In cooperation with varying combinations of private and local governmental
groups, the federal government is now operating a veritable galaxy
of programs under the Housing and Home Finance Agency, including FHA and other similar loan insurance programs," housing repair loan insurance,6 interest-free loans for planning of community
facilities, 7 loans and grants-in-aid for urban renewal (consisting of
urban redevelopment and urban rehabilitation),8 grants-in-aid for
acquisition of open space, 9 grants-in-aid for certain public planning
programs, 10 and low-rental public housing loans.'
I

Denver Post, issues of October 9, 1961, through October 14, 1961, inclusive.
2 Jacobs, How Money Can Make or Break Our Cities, 25 Reporter 6: 38-40 (Oct. 12, 1961).
3 A brief history of the regulatory ordinances is found in Kurtz, The Effect of Land Use Legislation
on the Common Law of Nuisance in Urban Areas, 36 DICTA 414, 417 (1959).
4 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, Second Inaugural Address, 1937.
5 48 Stat. 1248 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1709 et seq. (1958, and 1959-1960 Supp.). See
U.S.C. citations for amendments through 1960, and 75 Stat. 149 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 195 (July,
1961) for amendments made in the Housing Act of 1961. See also 73 Stat.0 667 (1959) as amended
by 75 Stat. 149 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 179 (July, 1961), 12 U.S.C. § 17 1cl (1959-1960 Supp.) re
housing for the elderly; 64 Stat. 54 (1950) as amended by 65 Stat. 648 (1951), 67 Stat. 123 (1953)
68 Stat. 595 (1954), 60 Stat. 635 (1955), 70 Stat. 1094 (1956), 71 Stat. 297 (1957), 73 Stat. 655, 664
(1959), and 75 Stat. 149 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 177 (July, 1961), 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1958, and 19591960 Cumm. Supp.), re cooperative housing; 62 Stat. 1276 (1948), as amended by 64 Stat. 59 (1950)
and 74 Stat. 664 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 1747 (1958, and 1959-1960 Cumm. Supp.) re rental housing for
moderate income families; and 64 Stat. 77 (1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1749 re housing by
educational institutions (See U.S.C. reference for numerous amendment citations).
664 Stat. 48, as amended by 65 Stat. 173 (1951), 67 Stat. 121 (1953), 68 Stat. 591 (1954), 73
Stat. 664 (1959), 12 U.S.C. 1706c (1958, and 1959.1960 Cumm. Supp.).
7 55 Stat. 361 (1941), 42 U.S.C. § 1531 (1958) as amended by 75 Stat. 149, 8 F.C.A. Supp. 191
(July,1961).
863 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958), as amended by 75 Stat. 149 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp.
182 (July, 1961).
lt 75 Stat. 149 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 202 (July, 1961).
1t 68 Stat. 640 (1954), as amended by 70 Stat. 1102 (1956), 71 Stat. 305 (1957), 73 Stat. 678 (1959),
75 Stat. 149 (1961), 40 U.S.C. § 460 (1958, and 1959-1960 Cumin. Supp.), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 187 (July,
1961).
11 50 Stat. 888 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1435 (1958 and 1959-1960 Cumm. Supp.).
See U.S.C. citations for numerous amendments to almost every section.
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The multiplicity of programs resulted from the eventual recognition of the fact that no one of these programs was a panacea for
the cure of all urban ills, though each has its role. Hence, each
program should be clearly understood and examined in the light of
what it is, and what it is intended to accomplish. Misuse is both
disillusioning and expensive.
Urban renewal is one of the newer programs. Basically, it involves two kinds of activities: (1) urban redevelopment, and (2)
urban rehabilitation.
"Urban redevelopment," as a technical term, has come to mean
generally the elimination of substandard structures through acquisition (by purchase or by eminent domain) and clearance. It
differs from public housing primarily in that the principal public
purpose ceases when the land has been cleared. 12 Usually, the land
is then sold to private enterprise for the construction of new buildings under such terms and conditions as will minimize the likelihood of the eventual recurrence of slums. Because of the great
amount of capital required, most urban redevelopment projects
have federal participation, but there are notable exceptions, especially in Chicago and Baltimore.
"Urban rehabilitation," as a technical term, refers to a program
to restore and renovate marginal properties, although some spot
clearance may also occur. Special long term repair loan insurance
is made available to the landowners, but the loans must still be
floated by private lending agencies under the "special assistance
of FHA program." Both the private lenders and local FHA officials
have shown marked reluctance to use this program, even with a
guaranteed "take-out" (mortgage purchase) by the FNMA. In addition to financial aid, special technical staff services are provided
by the local urban renewal authority to analyze deficiencies in
structures, to recommend proper steps to remedy these deficiencies,
and to assist the residents or owners in taking these steps (on a
self-help or on a hired-help basis). Property acquisition is kept to
a minimum.
These two programs are intended to be a kind of "partnership"
between the public and the private interests in a community to
achieve a better quality of urban development.1 3 They are basically
remedial in character and do not substitute for the regulatory
measures designed to prevent slum formation on the one hand, or
for the measures to rehouse the economically submarginal families
on the other.
As observed recently by William Slayton, U.S. Commissioner
of Urban Renewal, 4 the municipality's action is the keystone of
the urban renewal effort. Colorado authorized such activities by
12 "The main object of this legislation is to eliminate slum and blighted areas as defined in the
act . . . . The General Assembly has selected a method whereby the object shall be accomplished
not by public ownership of the land but rather through private endeavor and ownership under the
direction of authorized officials. The acquisition and transfer to private parties is a mere incident
of the chief purpose of the act which is rehabilitation of the area." Rabinoff v. District Court,
360 P.2d 114, 118-119 (Colo.,1961).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-4-1 (1953): "[Tihis article is ertacted to provide means whereby said areas
may be redeveloped by private enterprise with such assistance from public funds as may be furnished in accordance with the provisions of this article"; 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 441
(1958): "The policy to be followed in attaining the national housing objective established shall be
(1). private enterprise shall be encouraged to serve as large a part of the total need as it can;
(2) governmental assistance shall be utilized where feasible to enable private enterprise to serve
more of the total need ....
"
14 Reported in the Denver Post, Dec. 14, 1961.
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1
its municipal corporations by the "Rehabilitation Act of 1945.' 5
In essence, this statute requires that the municipal planning commission establish a plan for the redevelopment of any "substandard
or unsanitary area" in the municipality. The city council or town
board then adopts the plan, and establishes an authority to carry
out the plan. This authority has the following nine special powers:
(1) To acquire the area by purchase, gift, condemnation or
otherwise;
(2) To designate and set aside such part or parts of the area as
may be necessary or desirable for public grounds;
(3) To vacate existing plats of part or all of the area, and to
replat the same, and to establish streets, parks, and other public
grounds;
(4) To remove any of the existing structures in the area so as
to permit reconstruction, and to construct public improvements on
the public grounds;
(5) To secure the necessary funds for the execution of the program, including borrowing money, receiving grants, and obtaining
financial assistance by such other means or methods as may be
provided in the development plan for the area;
(6) To issue revenue or general obligation bonds or debentures
in payment of money borrowed. A mortgage may be given on the
property in an area, except the public grounds, and the proceeds
and rentals therefrom pledged to secure the debentures;
(7) To sell or give long term leases on all or any part of the
property in the area, except the public grounds, to a "reconstruction agency" to erect improvements thereon in accordance with
the development plan;
(8) To make such contracts as may be needed to execute the
other powers of the authority;
(9) To initiate and prosecute proceedings for the assessment of
part of the cost of the land in the area to other property specially
benefited by the redevelopment of the area. 16 The power described
in No. 7 above is also a duty.
The other powers of the authority are the usual grants of suing
and defending in litigation and of exercising the power of eminent
domain (including the power of superior eminent domain).
Home rule cities may use this statute if they so desire,17 but it
is not essential. 18 The need for the authority as a structural form
to accomplish this program can be questioned. The creation of such
a body is not conducive to the maximum coordination of the program with general city operations, and the potential exists for a
program which is irrelevant or antagonistic to the other programs
and objectives of the municipal government.
The prevalent opinion among the federal officials seems to
favor authorities because the centralization of the activity in this
way reduces the number of different policy-level officials who are
working on the local program at various phases. This author's experience has been that any attempt by a home rule city to use its
15 Colo. Rev. Stat., ch. 69, art. 4 (1953).
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-4-7 (1953).
17 Rabinoff v. District Court, supra note 12, at 122 (Colo.,1961).
18Mimeo material prepared by the Denver city attorney'soffice which accompanied
initial application for urban redevelopment loan and grant funds during 1949A1950.
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powers to devise a different local organization is strongly resisted
by the federal officials, and delays of many months occur before
any agreement is reached. The possible greater local efficiency
which might result from using the freedom of a home rule city in
managing its own affairs is thus negated by interminable arguments with the federal officials (the financial incentive of federal
aid being too great to "go it alone").
Since the Housing and Home Finance Agency will advance
renewal program,
loans for the planning and execution of an urban
19
and will give grants-in-aid for either two-thirds or three-fourths"
of the net cost of an urban renewal project (the gross cost of the
project less the proceeds from the sale of the cleared land), most
communities orient their urban renewal (synonymous with the
state term "rehabilitation") programs around the federal standards
and requirements.
The attorney confronted with the task of securing federal urban
renewal assistance can rapidly secure a library on the subject by
securing the pertinent statutes, 21regulations, handbooks and forms
from his regional HHFA office.
Urban renewal measures will not improve the quality of the
urban community unless simultaneous steps are taken for preventing the same condition from recurring in other areas. In order to
secure the maximum effectiveness from its aid, the federal government requires as a condition precedent to receiving aid that the
municipality develop what'22is known as a "workable program for
The objectives to be achieved by this
community improvement.
program have been stated in one HHFA form to be:
(1) To assure adequate standards of health, sanitation, and
safety through a comprehensive system of codes and ordinances
which state the minimum conditions under which dwellings
may lawfully be occupied;
(2) The formulation and official recognition of a comprehensive general plan for the community as a whole;
(3) To determine what areas are blighted or in danger of
becoming blighted and the identification of the nature, intensity, and causes of blight as a basis for the planning of neighborhoods of decent homes in a suitable living environment;
(4) To identify and establish the administrative responsibility and capacity for carrying out overall Program for*Community Improvement activities and for the enforcement of
codes and ordinances;
(5) The recognition of need by the community and the
development of the means for meeting the costs of carrying
out an effective program for the elimination and prevention of
slums and blight;
(6) A community program to relocate families displaced
by governmental action in decent, safe, and sanitary housing
19 71 Stat. 299 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (1958).
2075 Stat. 149 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 182 (July, 1961).
21 Colorado is located in Region V. The office of the Regional Administrator is located at 30
West Vickery Boulevard, Fort Worth 4, Texas.
2263 Stat. 414 (1949), as amended by 68 Stat. 623 (1954), 69 Stat. 638 (1955), 70 Stat. 1103
(1956), 73 Stat. 659, 670, 677 (1959). 42 U.S.C. § 1451c (1958, and 1959-1960 Supp.). See also
Rhyne, The Workable Program-A Challenge for Community Improvement, 25 Law and Contemporary
Problems 685 (1960).
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within their means. Governmental action includes code enforcement, slum clearance, and the construction of highways and
other public works;
(7) Community-wide participation on the part of individuals and representative citizens' organizations which will help
to provide, both in the community generally and in selected
areas,
the understanding and support necessary to insure suc23
cess.
The purpose of this last requirement is to assure to the maximum, feasible extent the coordinated utilization of all local tools for
the improvement of urban quality in order to have an effective attack on the problem of urban slums. In practice the results have
been uneven, as financing problems, relocation problems, problems
of land resale, and occasionally adverse community reaction have
affected the program. The program has also been somewhat hampered by the lack of coordination among the great variety of federal programs dealing 'with urban quality, as described at the beginning of this discussion.
The urban renewal project itself must have reasonable prospects for maintaining sound quality. Numerous unfortunate experiences with public housing project locations largely dispelled the
naive idea that a small island of sound construction in the midst of
a sea of blight could maintain its high standards, or encourage
adjacent private landowners to improve their properties. In order
to achieve these objectives, an urban renewal project must have
two characteristics: (1) standard quality of development must be
attained throughout the project area, and (2) it must either be
firmly anchored in existing standard areas or be of sufficiently
large size to create its own self-contained environment. Reconstruction in accordance with a unified development plan is a major aid
in attaining stability of good quality development, 24 and the acquisition of sound structures within the project area, by eminent
domain if necessary, in order to assemble the land for a planned
reconstruction is a proper exercise of local governmental powers
in support of the general objective
of developing a "better balanced,
''2
more attractive community. 5
2:4 HHFA Form H-1082.
24 Required in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-4-4 (1953), and in 63 Stat. 414 (1949),
Stat. 624 (1954), 70 Stat. 1097, 1099 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 1452d.
25 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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The Colorado Constitution provides safeguards for the rights
26
of one whose property is taken under an urban renewal project.
The U.S. Housing Act, in section 106(f) as amended, 27 provides additional assistance for the occupants of such property whether or
not they are owners. This relocation assistance is outlined in some
detail in the regulations issued by the Federal Urban Renewal Administration.2 8 Basically, they provide (1) that the local agency must
assist in relocating displaced families in standard housing, (2) that
moving expenses can be paid both for residential and business occupants, and (3) that direct losses of personal property can be reimbursed. In addition, the Small Business Administration may aid
in the relocation of eligible businesses.2 9 Timing is of the essence
for the preservation of some of these rights, and the attorney representing a client owning or occupying property which will be taken
in an urban renewal project will do well to determine the current
regulations before the client makes any overt acts toward relocation.
In urban rehabilitation projects, special mortgage insurance
provisions are available to minimize the need for acquisition (socalled "Sec. 220 loans"). "0 In urban redevelopment projects, "Sec.
221 loans" assist in the financing of housing earmarked for relocation of persons displaced in the course of the clearance process 3 1
The only relationship between urban renewal projects and public
housing projects is found in this phase, because in many renewal
projects a sizeable minority of the families which must be relocated are eligible for admission to public housing projects.
Once the land has been clea'red, it is prepared for resale to private enterprise. This involves the allocation of any land reserved
for public use, possibly replatting of the land, and possibly installation of various public improvements. A development plan is prepared as a guide to the prospective purchaser indicating generally
the type of proposed land use. Three types of bidding are commonly used, depending on the circumstances:
(1) Fixed purchase price, with the competition on the development plan;
(2) Open competitive bidding on price, based on the general
land use plan proposed by the local urban renewal authority; or
(3) Negotiated sale under special circumstances (as for instance,
when the land for sale is too small to be a separate building site and
the only logical purchasers are the adjacent land owners).
The successful bidder is bound to the execution of his proposed
development plan or of the general plan of the local urban renewal
authority. The first land to be sold in Colorado under this program will be from the Avondale redevelopment project in Denver
in 1962.
"(; Colo. Const., art. II, § 15.
2770 Stat. 1100 (1956), as amended by 71 Stat. 300 (1957), 73 Stat. 673, 674, 676 (1959), 75
Stat. 149 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 1456f (1958, and 1959.1960 Cumm. Supp.), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 170 (July,
1961).
2S 26 F.R. 5712-15 (me
27, 1961), as amended by 26 F.R. 7826 (Aug. 23, 1961).
21175 Star. 149, 167 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 164, 168 (July, 1961).
30t68 Stat. 596 (1954), as amended by 69 Stat. 635 (1955), 70 Stat. 1C94, 1102 (1956), 71 Stat.
8 (1957), 71 Stat. 295, 297 (1957), 72 Stat. 73 (1958), 73 Stat. 657, 664 (1959), 75 Stat. 149 (1961),
12 U.S.C. 1715k (1958, and 1959-1960 Supp.), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 185 (July, 1961).
3 68 Stat. 599 (1954), as amended by 69 Stat. 635 (1955), 70 Stat. 1094, 1102 (1956), 71 Stat
297 (1957), 73 Stat. 658 (1959), 75 Stat. 149 (1961), 12 U.S.C. 1715L (1958, and 1959-1960 Cumm,
Supp.), 8 F.C.A. 185 (July, 1961).

DICTA

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER,

1962

Urban renewal projects were an outgrowth of housing reform
legislation. The early statutes required that almost all of the funds
(90%) be devoted to predominantly residential projects. Gradually,
a more sophisticated approach to urban quality has been developed,
and the 1961 Housing Act authorized 30% of the federal funds for
non-residential projects.32 This affords new possibilities in such
projects as downtown redevelopment, but it provides an equally
great challenge for the development of techniques to renew such
areas.
Urban renewal has been a constantly developing and changing
program since its inception in 1949. Case law is minimal except on
constitutional questions. 33 Much of the controlling law is contained
in the regulations issued by the Urban Renewal Administration of
the Housing and Home Finance Agency. It is imperative for an
attorney having contact with an urban renewal project, whether
as a city attorney, as counsel for the owner of land in a project, or
as counsel for a prospective bidder on land in a project, to determine the current law on the subject.
Properly handled, urban renewal represents a promising partnership among the federal government, local units of government,
and private enterprise, to restore and maintain the vitality of our
urban communities while at the same time safeguarding the rights
of private landowners involved in such projects.
3275 Stat. 149, 168 (1961), 8 F.C.A. Supp. 186 (July, 1961).
33 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo., 1961); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see
annotation at 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (1955), 2 A.L.R.2d Supp. Serv. 2999 (1960), A.L.R.2d Supp. Serv. 561
(Jan, 1961), A.R.S.2d Supp. Serv. 247 (midyear, 1961), far an extensive collection of cases on the
constitutional issues.
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SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS AND
COMPULSORY DEDICATIONS
By L.
I.

RICHARD FREESE, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

The growth of our American cities during the post-war years
has been achieved, to a great extent, by subdivision development
on the urban fringe. A typical subdivision is on an impressive scale,
with a minimum of fifty lots and a marked increase in the appurtenances of urbanization. Incident to this growth there has been
increased sensitivity by our public-minded citizens to the fact that
planned and regulated urban expansion would not only promote
the aesthetic pleasures of future city habitation but avoid the many
difficulties created by sporadic, unregulated expansion of former
years. Municipal control of urban development has moved beyond
mere zoning regulations and is now promoting orderly growth by
subtle, yet more penetrating, requirements imposed upon promotersubdividers as conditions for official approval of their plats and
the development and sale of their land.'
These newer post-war planning controls are denoted "compulsory dedications." Such dedications will be the focus of this
article. For these purposes, compulsory dedications must be distinguished from zoning regulations. Typical zoning regulations determine whether the land is to be used for residential, industrial, or

trade purposes, or control the size of the proposed lots or of the
house footage, or establish the degree of set-back of a proposed
2
structure from the street. Compulsory dedications, by comparison,
typically involve the following relinquishments of the subdivided
land to public ownership:
a. Inner-subdivision streets:
streets which primarily serve
inhabitants
as access-ways to the city's
the subdivision's
3
major arteries.
b. Major municipal streets: streets which primarily serve the
entire municipal populace, or at least a larger segment of
populace than the inhabitants of the subdivision
the entire
4

itself.
c. Rights-of-way for inner-subdivision utilities: easements for
basic public utilities (water, sewer, electricity, telephone)
needed for the new inhabitants. 5

The author, an associate of the Denver firm of Lewis, Grant & Davis, is grateful for the advice
and assistance of Clyde 0. Martz, Esq., in the preparation of this article.
I Most planning ordinances provide that a subdivision plat shall not be "recorded" until the
conditions are met, thus implying that a subdivision may be completed regardless of such conditions
if the developer is willing to forego recordation. However, the promotional advantages, indeed the
necessities of recordation, make such inhibition an effective sanction. In many states, recordation
is the only lawful way to set up a new subdivision. See Carter, J., in dissent in Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
2 E.g., Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code §610-649 (1958).
3 See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supra note 1, where one of the dedications under
attack was a requirement that the subdivider relinquish eighty, rather than the proposed sixty feet
for a subdivision street which ran into a major city artery. 'ee also Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164,
106 N.E.2d 503 (Ct. of App. 1952), where access roads to the proposed lots were required.
4 See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supra note 1, involving a dedication of twenty
extra feet for future expansion of a major city thoroughfare. See also Krieger v. Planning Commission of Howard County, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961), where petitioner resisted a required
dedication of fifty feet from the center of a "major street."
5 See footnote 6 infra.

DICTA

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER,

1962

d. Rights-of-way for future expansion of public utility systems: easements for utilities which will provide not only
for the subdivision's inhabitants but for other neighboring
subdivisions. 6
e. Inner-subdivision public spaces: portions of the subdivision
area deeded to the municipality for public recreational and
educational facilities, designed primarily to provide for the
needs of the new inhabitants.7
f. Community-wide public spaces: portions of the subdivision
area deeded to the municipality for general municipal recreational and educational
enjoyment, beyond the needs of
8
the new inhabitants.
g. Cash in lieu of public facilities: required payment of funds
to a public fund in place of actual dedication of land to
public ownership.9
Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 10 the first zoning case to
reach the United States Supreme Court, the typical zoning regulations mentioned above have been considered acceptable modes of
municipal control over private land use. Under the police power
of each state, such zoning laws have been deemed consonant with
the "public health, safety and general welfare."" Zoning is typically
a restriction on use. It may well depreciate the value of one's property, but does not open up that property to public use. It is difficult,
therefore, to envision the effect of such zoning regulations as an
unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation. Zoning laws have been deemed "unreasonable" only in the
instances in which they actually negative 2all practical use or undermine all actual value of the zoned land.'
It is less difficult to envision a "taking" for public use in tracing the effects of compulsory dedications. In each of the six enumerated typical dedications above, the subdivider is actually required
to deed his property to the corporate public body. Unlike the zoning
laws, these compulsory dedications more directly highlight the conflict between the police power and the eminent domain provisions
6 In Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal.2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1958), the subdivider was required
to pay $99.07 per acre for a city "Subdivision Drainage Fund" as a condition for plot approval.
In Lake Intervale Homes v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28 (1958),
the subdivider was compelled to install such water mains, sewers, etc. "as may be required by
the governing body."
7 In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 111.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961), an ordinance required the dedication of land in each new subdivision to "public
grounds." In Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 111.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960), the city
ordinance required the subdivider to dedicate land to "facilitate the establishment of school
facilities convenient to any proposed subdivision . . . as may be deemed necessary by the Planning
Commission ....
" In Miller v. City of Beaver Foils, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), the statute
provided for reservation for future appropriation of four and one-half acres of the subdivider's
lnd, pursuant to a "general plan for parks." In Fortson In estment Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179
Okla. 473, 66 P.2d 96 (1937), the planning board required dedication of five per cent of each
subdivision before approval of submitted plot was given. In Kelber v. City of Upland, supra
note 6, $30 per lot was required to be contributed to a "Park and School Site Fund." See also In re
Lake Secor Development Co., 141 Misc. 918, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (1931), and Coronado Development
Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962).
8 See footnote 7 supra.
9 Kelber v. City of Upland, supra notes 6 and 7. In Coronado Development Co. v. City of
McPherson, supro note 7, an ordinance provided that if ten per cent of a subdivision was not
designated on the city master plan for pork dedication, then subdivider must pay ten per cent of
his land's value in lieu thereof.
10 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
11 See, e.g., Fischer v. Bedminister Tp., 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) per Vanderbilt, J. See
also Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban Fringe,
1961 Wis. L. Rev. 370 (1961).
12 See e.g., Denver v. Denver Buick, 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959); Appeal of Medinger,
377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954); Ritenour v. Dearborn Tp., 326 Mich. 242, 40 N.W.2d 137 (1949).
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of our state and federal constitutions. Compulsory dedications, as
the zoning laws, find their constitutional justification in the state
police power.13 Unfortunately, there has been considerable confusion in the courts over the divergent characteristics of compulsory dedications and of zoning laws and over their respective constitutional bases. 14 A semantical conflict has arisen over whether
the police power concept should be used to "promote" the public
needs, rather than simply "protect" it. 15 Some courts view the
police power as an expansive tool, fit to justify non-compensable
public action when the exigencies of the community overshadow
private speculation. Other courts argue that the police power must
not be allowed to become a doctrine of gargantuan statism, negativing any meaningful efficacy to the constitutional eminent domain
provisions. In short, it is presently unclear at what point noncompensable compulsory dedications overflow into unconstitutional
confiscations for public use. The state judicial temper, no doubt,
has a great deal to do with the decisional result. 16
A second constitutional problem is the due process concern
over improper delegations of legislative power. This is a general
administrative law problem. Its significance in this particular area
is as yet unexplored. 17 Generally, there must be enabling statutes
which provide for the planning regulations employed. 18 Such statutes must set forth sufficient guidelines so that planning commission approval of subdivision plats will not be subject to ad hoc,
discriminatory conditions.19 Although as a matter of practice, the
planning authorities may be acting in a manner comporting with
"fair play," the standards for administrative control are often so
vague that subdividers may be subject to the arbitrary whims of
planning authority personnel. This is' less than due process. Moreover, it is not always clear that the scope of control is justified
under an appropriate enabling statute.
In general, any subdivision control program must be sustained
as a reasonable exercise of the police power and be circumscribed
by clear guidelines in the enabling legislation.
13 See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supro note 1; Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect, supra note 7.
14 E.g., Krieger v. Planning Commission of Howard County, supra note 4; Newton v. American
Security Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941).
15 See Frantz, J., concurring in Denver v. Denver Buick, supro note 12 at 143.
16 See Cutler, supro note 11.
17 See Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 Cornell L.Q. 258 (1955).
18 Denver v. Denver Buick, supra note 12 at 131-38.
19 Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
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II. THE POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles,2 was a landmark case
involving the constitutionality of compulsory dedications. The city
council imposed four conditions for plat approval upon the petitioner-subdivider:
(1) dedication of a ten-foot strip for future
widening of a major city thoroughfare running along the subdivision's boundary; (2) an additional dedication of ten feet adjoining
the major thoroughfare for trees and shrubs to prevent access from
the adjoining lots onto the busy highway; (3) dedication of the
eighty-foot street rather than the proposed sixty-foot street, to run
vertically into the major thoroughfare; and (4) dedication of an
isolated triangle strip to street use. In a sweeping, latitudinarian
opinion, the California Supreme Court upheld the "findings" of the
trial court whereby these four requirements were "reasonably
related to the protection of the public health, safety and general
welfare. '21 In answer to the petitioner's contention that his property had been taken for public use without compensation, the court22
reasoned that the dedication was "voluntary, at least in theory."
The Ayres majority suggests that it is irrelevant that the benefits
of the first requirement would primarily be received by the general
public, not the subdivision's inhabitants, for in its view the police
power justified the "promoting" of public goals.
The Ayres viewpoint has not been universally embraced. Indeed, the Illinois and Pennsylvania courts have taken a much more
restrictive attitude. In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village
of Mount Prospect,23 the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that "the
developer may be required to assume those costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which would
otherwise be cast upon the public," but "the subdivider should not
be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying" the community's
educational and recreational problems, for such "would amount to
an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation. ' 2 In reconciling the conflict between eminent domain and the
20 Supro note 1.
21 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supra note 1. Accord, Krieger v. Planning Commission of
Howard County, supro note 4; Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164. 106 N.E.2d 503 (Ct. of App., 1952). See
dicta in Caledonia v. Racine Limestone Co., 266 Wis. 475, 63 N.W.2d 697 at 699 (1954).
See also,
Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); Newton v. American Security Co.,
supra note 14.
22 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Col.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949).
See also Ridgefield
Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928). Compare the dissent in Ayres
by Carter, J., which rejects this reasoning as pure sophistry. Carter, J., points out that in actuality,
regardless of "in theory," the advantages of plat recordation are so great as to make the sanction
of non-recordation an effective inhibition to resistance.
Cf., MansfieId and Swett v. Town of
West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A.2d 225 (1938).
23 22 111.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
24 Id. at 801-02. See also the dicta in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 at
233-234 (Ill., 1960). Accord, Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
It is
interesting to note that the California Court seems to have shifted its position in Kelber v. City of
Upland, 155 Cal.2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957), holding that "The purpose and intent of the Sub.
division Map Act [the California enabling act] is to provide for the regulation and control of the
design and improvement of a subdivision with a proper consideration of its relation to adjoining
areas, and not to provide funds for the benefit of an entire city .... . .
In so holding, the
California court skirted the constitutional issue faced in the Ayres case but by this statutory
interpretation, the court has effectively narrowed the latitudian view of the Ayres majority. Of
course, the Kelber holding does not constitutionally forbid the California legislature from passing
an enabling act to provide for funds in lieu of actual dedications.
Nevertheless, the majority's
langua e indicates a more restrictive view of the constituttional issues would now be taken by
the California Supreme Court.
It is of interest that the three dissenters in Kelber were in the
majority in Ayres while the Kelber majority was made up of new members of the California
bench.
In Fortson Investment Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okla. 473, 66 P.2d 96 (1937), the Okla.
homa court did not pass upon the issue of whether a required dedication of five per cent of every
subdivision for public open spaces was a non-compensated taking for public use, holding that
the trial court had correctly found that the dedication was "voluntary;"
the implication of the
court's languoge, however, is that a "compulsory"
dedication would be forbidden.
In re Lake
Secor Development Co., 141 Misc. 918, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (1931) could be squared with these cases.
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police power, these more conservative courts have enunciated the
general proposition that the scope of the permissible compulsory
dedication must be equitably related to the needs of the new community. 25 It is unreasonable to condition the use of private land
upon a toll for the general community benefit. It is submitted that
the Colorado Supreme Court would be receptive to this general
proposition. In the recent Denver Buick case, 26 the court discussed
the scope of the state police power in holding that a zoning ordinance requiring off-street parking upon petitioners' property was
an unconstitutional confiscation for public ends:
The legal effect of the argument of the City is that it
has a problem of concentration of traffic in the street and
that accordingly there is a right, under the zoning ordinance, to appropriate for off-street parking substantial portions of property of citizens desiring to use that property
for a legitimate purpose ....

No such power exists in the

City thus to take private property for a public purpose
27
without compensation to the owner for the taking.
Not only does the Denver Buick language reflect a watchful solicitude for the efficacy of the eminent domain provisions, there is
indeed little difference between this off-street parking zoning law
and many compulsory dedication requirements, such as b, d, and f,
enumerated above.
Assuming that the Pioneer Trust proposition would be adopted
by the Colorado Supreme Court in judging the constitutionality of
the compulsory dedications imposed by our various Colorado municipal planning bodies, the following decisional results would be
reached with regard to the six typical dedications enumerated:
a. Inner-subdivision streets: being related primarily to the
subdivision's needs, such dedications should not be envipublic use, for the purport of the
sioned as "takings" for
28
requirement is private.

b. Major municipal streets: such dedications must be compensated unless the municipality can show that the new inhabitants will appreciably increase the artery's traffic, in
which case the subdeveloper should donate an appropriate
portion to 29
compensate for the additional burden upon the
public fisc.

c. Inner-subdivision utilities' easements:
held under the same logic as in "a".

30

these would be up-

d. Utility easements for future community expansion: unless
the developer is compensated for a pro rata portion of such
dedications designed to provide for other than his subdivi25 See especially

Pioneer

Trust and Savings

Bank v. Village of Mount

Prospect,

supro note 23.

26 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959).
27 Id. at 131.
28 E.g., Regulations of the Denver Planning Office, as adopted on September 26, 1956 [hereafter
called "1956 Reg.'s"], Sec. V, C, (4) (dealing with alignment of subdivision streets with other
existing streets), (9)-(10) (dealing with width of streets). Compare proposed Regulations of the
Denver Planning Office [hereinafter called "1962 Reg.'s"], Section B, 2, (a). Regulations of Arvada
Planning Commission (non-home rule city), as adopted on April 16, 1962 [hereinafter called "Arvoda
Reg.'s"], Section 5, C, (1), (2), (a), (b) and (d).
29 E.g., "1956 Reg.'s" Sec. V, C, (1) (9) (10) (dealing with primary streets of one hundred feet
width). Compare "1962 Reg.'s" Sec. B, 2, (c). "Arvada Reg.'s," Section 5, C, (2) (c).
30 E.g., "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, C, (8), providing for easements for storm sewers, sanitary sewers
and water mains to serve the new inhabitants. Compare "1962 Reg.'s," Sec. B, 2, (f). "Arvoda
Reg.'s," Section 5, E, (1) and (3).
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sion's inhabitants,
such would be an unconstitutional con3
fiscation.
e. Inner-subdivision public spaces: again, these would be up32
held under the "a" logic.
f. Community-wide public spaces: again, a formula reflecting
the recreational needs of the new inhabitants and of the
entire community must be achieved, the subdivider being
compensated for that
33 portion given primarily for use of the
entire municipality.
g. Cash in lieu of public facilities: if the payment required
was equitably in substitute for the dedication not so required, and such payment were related to the subdivision's
activities, it should be upheld. However, the courts seem
reluctant to take this step. In Kelber v. City of Upland
(California) 34 and Coronado Development Co. v. City of
McPherson (Kansas), 35 the courts held that the enabling
statute did not provide for cash in place of actual dedication. No cases, however, have squarely faced the constitutional issue.
III. THE DUE PROCESS DELEGATION PROBLEM
Dedication requirements must be authorized by appropriate
enabling legislation. 36 Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59-2 (1953) provides
for the creation of. city planning commissions. Colo. Rev. Stat.
§139-59-6 (1953) empowers these planning commissions to make a
master plan for their cities, locating streets, parks, public utilities,
etc. This enabling act is sufficiently broad to authorize the compulsory dedications delineated above. 37 However, this act "applies
to home rule charter cities [only] so far as constitutionally per31 E.g., "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, C, (8), providing for easements for "the extension of main sewers
and similar utilities." Compare "1962 Reg.'s," Sec. B, 2, (f). Note also "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, C,
(6), requiring the dedication of easements along all streams "for drainage, parkway or recreational
use." "Arvada Reg.'s," Section 5, E, (1), and Section 5, G.
32 E.g.. "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, B, requiring dedication for public open spaces "a reasonable size
for neighborhood playground, park and public uses." "Arvd Re .'s," Section 5, H.
33 E.g., "1962 Reg.'s," Sec. B, 2, (e), providing that "Areas designated on the Comprehensive
Plan as parks, playgrounds, schools or other public uses should be dedicated or an option to
purchase given to the City for a period of 5 years."
34 155 Cal.2d 631, 318 P.2d 661 (1958).
35 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962).
36 Denver v. Denver Buick, supra note 12; Kelber v. City of Upland, supra note 24; Coronado
Development Co. v. City of McPherson, supra note 35; Beach v. Zoning Commission of the Town of
Milford, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814, 817 (1954).
37 See, e.g., Arvada Ordinance No. 333, Nov. 25, 1957.
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missible and so far as limits placed upon its application within the
boundaries of home rule charter cities by the charter of each home
rule charter city individually. '38 Article XX of the Colorado Constitution states that "The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as
applicable, shall continue to apply to such [home rule] cities and
towns, except in so far as superseded by the charters
. . . or by
39
ordinances passed pursuant to such charters."
Section 651 of the Denver Ordinances provides for a "Subdivision Control Ordinance" whereby the Denver City Council must
approve or disapprove of each subdivision plat before it can be
recorded. The submitted plat is to be reviewed and approved by
various city departments, such as the Department of Public Works,
and a city Planning Office is authorized to set up regulations and
rules for its recommendations to the city council regarding the
propriety of the proposed subdivision. Basically, plat approval in
Denver consists of action by the Denver City Council, under recommendations from its Planning Office and other city departments.
The enabling legislation for Denver's "Subdivision Control
Ordinance," pursuant to Article XX of the Colorado Constitution,
must be found in the Denver Charter. If the Charter does not authorize the ordinance, the state statutes must provide enablement.
The Denver Charter does not specifically authorize plat approvals
by the city council. However, Chapter B, Article I, Section B 1.12-1,
of the Denver Charter, provides that "The council shall have power
to enact and provide for the enforcement of all ordinances to protect life, health and property; . . . and to preserve and enforce good
government, general welfare, order and security . . . ." Moreover,
the "Zoning" provisions of the Denver Charter may provide sufficient authorization. Chapter B, Article I, Section B 1.13, grants the
city council power "to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories and size of buildings .... the size of yards, courts and other
open spaces . . . and the location and use of buildings, structures
and land for trade, industry, residence and other purposes." This
"zoning" provision, however, points to typical zoning regulations,
not to compulsory dedications as such. Authorization might be
sought in Chapter A, Article II, setting up the Department of Public
Works. Section A 2.3-1 of that article provides that "no rights-ofway for streets . . . or other thoroughfares shall be established . . .
and no site for any public purpose shall be accepted until first approved by ordinance." However, in its plat-by-plat approval of subdivision plats pursuant to the "Subdivision Control Ordinance,"
the city council is acting more as an administrative body than as
a legislative body "by ordinance."
The inquiry as to whether a Denver ordinance has specific
authorization under the Denver Charter is brought forth because of
language found in the Denver v. Denver Buick case. 40 There, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the Denver Charter did not
provide for certain zoning ordinances, thus, such ordinances could
not be legally sustained. Therefore, the court viewed the Denver
home rule Charter as a grant of power to the city council, rather
3M Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59-1 (1953).
39 Colo. Const. art. XX, 16 (h).
40 141 Colo. 121, at 133-138 (1959).
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than a limitation upon the council's hegemony over local and municipal affairs. Of course, to the extent that a home rule ordinance
is not enabled by the home rule charter, the Colorado Constitution,
Article XX, allows the state statutes to apply. There may be difficulty, however, in squaring such planning ordinances with either
the city charter or the state statutes. Such is the case wi t h the
Denver "Subdivision Control Ordinance." If Denver's Ordinance
does not find authorization under the Charter, it also does not set
up a special planning commission with the powers and duties as
set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59 et seq. Pursuant to the Denver
Ordinance, the City's Planning Office has only recommendatory
powers.
An equally significant problem arises from the due process
requirement that administrative bodies shall act pursuant to sufficiently discernible guidelines, set forth in the legislative enabling
act. 41 The standards set forth in the Denver "Subdivision Control
Ordinance" are both sweeping and vague. The ordinance provides
that subdivisions should be "regulated and restricted in order to
insure an orderly growth and development of the City and County
of Denver. 42 The City Council shall impose "any reasonable conditions" to achieve that end. 43 In Prouty v. Heron, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that: "Without standards fixed by the law
[setting forth distinctions between various listing types of engineering, of which an applicant could be registered to practice only in
the type for which he qualified], the discretion to declare what the
law is, is delegated to the board [State Board of Engineer Examiners]. This cannot legally be done."' 4 It is arguable that the Denver control ordinance does not meet this due process qualification.
However, the non-home rule city enabling statutes, especially Colo.
Rev. Stat. §139-59-14 (1953), are less susceptible to due process
criticism. Not only are the policy goals set out more specifically in
those sections than in the Denver control ordinance, no subdivision
control can be undertaken until the commission adopts a comprehensive plan and sets up official regulations. 45 The Denver "Comprehensive Plan" was repealed as an ordinance, formerly Section
660 of the Denver Ordinances, in 1958.46 The control ordinance does
not bind the city council's approval of plats to any of the regulations set up by its own Planning Office, whose approval or disapproval of a submitted plat is purely recommendatory. 47 Thus,
any unconstitutional vagueness of the Denver control ordinance
would not be clarified under those cases which hold that a lack of
sufficient guidelines is cured by the adoption of binding adminis-

trative regulations, either formally or by administrative practice. 48

41 Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953); Smith v. City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1,
74 N.W.2d 770 (1956); Caledonia v. Racine Limestone Co., 266 Wis. 475, 63 N.W.2d 97 (1954); Lake
Intervale Homes v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28, 38.40 (1958);
Mansfield and Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A.2d 225 (1938).
42 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 0651.1 (1958).
43 Id. at §651.9.
44 127 Colo. 168 at 176. See Lake Intervole, supra note 40. Beach v. Zoning Commission of
Town of Milford, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814, 817 (1954); Borough of Oakland v. Roth, 28 N.J.
Super. 321, 100 A.2d 698, 701.2 (1953).
45 Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59-14 (1953).
46 Repealed by Sec. 2 (d), Ordinance 218, Series 1958.
47 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code §651.9-.10 (1958). See the introduction to The Low and
Rules in the proposed 1962 Planning Office Regulations.
48 E.g., Osious v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 698, 75 N.W.2d 25, 27 (1956).
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CONCLUSION

Urban planning should be encouraged. Its benefits are many,
both now and in the future. In achieving our public goals, we must
take note of the paths which our constitutional framework requires
us to take. As has been discussed, the law is not settled as to the
rights and obligations of the public planning bodies in this area
of subdivision dedications. This article has attempted to prognosticate the direction in which Colorado law will move with respect
to this important matter.
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URBAN RENEWAL OF BUSINESS PROPERTY THE PREDOMINANTLY RESIDENTIAL REQUIREMENT
By

HENRY STRAND*

The substance and character of legislation at a given point in
history is often a revealing reflection of the times. Usually, as ideas
and principles in legislation become outmoded, the legislation is
eliminated, or remains unimplemented. In this process of legislative evolution, however, all too often there remain a substantial
number of laws enacted in days gone by that stay vigorously alive
although they have outlived their usefulness. They are, as it were,
"legalistic impedimenta," or more popularly, "deadwood legislation." With the disappearance of the rationale under which they
were initiated, they become an unnecessary obstacle to the orderly
development of and compliance with the law.
Few pieces of legislation appear to be immune to this infirmity,
if for no other reason than that there is seldom a complete meeting
of the minds on the merits of a given measure. Congressional legislation on housing and urban renewal appears to be no exception,
even though these programs since their inception have enjoyed
substantial bi-partisan political support.
There has been, for example, continued criticism of a provision
originally enacted in the Housing Act of 19492 which limited federal
aid for urban redevelopment to project areas that are predominantly residential either prior to or after redevelopment.3 This provision was evidence of a strong Congressional preference for renewal programs involving residential areas; renewal of industrial
and commerical property was, from the beginning, not only of secondary importance, but of significance only as it related to housing.
Although modified in form, this requirement is still vigorously
applied today, some thirteen years later. In considering current
urban renewal legislation in order to determine the scope of obtainable federal aid, the city official will be confronted with this
provision. He may understand its effect, but other aspects and
questions concerning the provision may remain: Why was it enacted? How was it applied? What was its development? Is it necessary today? These are only a few of the questions that are posed
and discussed, if not answered, in the following.

I.

ORIGIN OF THE REQUIREMENT

It should be mentioned by way of introduction that the 1949
Housing Act, in which the predominantly residential requirement
* Recent graduate University of Denver College of Law.
1 Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Ptogram, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 301, 313 (1958).
263 Stat. 413, 414 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §§1441 and 1450 et. seq. (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§1450 - 63 (Supp. II, 1959-60).
3 As originally enacted, Section 110(c) read as follows: (c) 'Project' may include (1) acquisition
of (i) a slum area or a deteriorated or deteriorating area which is predominantly residential in
character, or (ii) any other deteriorated or deteriorating area which is to be developed or redeveloped for predominantly residential uses, or (iii) land which is predominantly open and which
because of obsolete plotting, diversity of ownership, deterioration of structures or of site improvements, or otherwise substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the community and which
is to be developed for predominantly residential uses, or (iv) open land necessary for sound community growth which is to be developed for predominantly residential uses (in which event the
project thereon, as provided in the proviso of section 103(a)
1 0 hereof, shall not be eligible for any
capital grant); 63 Stat. 420 (1949), 0 amended, 42 U.S.C. § 46 (c) (Supp. II, 1959-60).
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first appeared, forms the basis for existing Congressional legislaamended several times
tion on urban renewal. The Act has been
since 1949, most significantly in 1954, 4 but the basic legislation is
still referred to as the Housing Act of 1949, as amended.
The rationale behind the predominantly residential requirement was formulated several years before enactment of the 1949
legislation. To a certain extent the proviso emerged with other
fundamental features of the federal urban renewal program. It is
interesting to note, however, that the so-called "Thomas bill," one
of the earlier proposals espousing federal aid for urban redevelopment, did not contain a proviso discriminating between residential
and non-residential property. 5
The Thomas bill was one of several proposals containing urban
renewal provisions that were considered by the important Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment of the Senate Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning. 6 This
subcommittee, chaired by the influential Senator Robert A. Taft,
established the theoretical framework for the predominantly residential requirement in extensive hearings held in 1944 and 1945 on
matters relating to housing and urban redevelopment.
In hearings of the subcommittee, urban planners voiced the
view that proposed legislation should be aimed at obtaining the
highest and best use for a re-developed area, and should not be
limited merely to fulfilling the post-war need for housing. Mr.
Alfred Bettman, Chairman of the American Institute of Planners,
stated the classic, oft-reiterated view of the planners:
A serious warning needs to be issued against conceiving
urban redevelopment as a subject identical with housing
or housing with little variations - housing the theme,
urban redevelopment the varaitions. Of the uses of the land
of an urban area, habitation is the largest running, I believe, from 60 to 75 percent; but this is just as true of . . .
the whole urban territory as of the blighted portion thereof. So, while housing construction will always form the
larger proportion of all urban redevelopment . . .
4 68 Stat. 590, 622 (1954),
(Supp. II, 1959-60).

42

U.S.C.

5 S. 953, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. §18
as is deemed appropriate as a unit of
separate from the developments of the
6 Hereafter referred to as the Taft

§§1451 et seq. (1958),

as

amended,

42

,

a costly
U.S.C.

§§1451-63

(1943). "Project area is an area of such extent and location
development project planning and for a development project
other parts of the municipality of urban area . .
Subcommittee.
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mistake will be made if urban redevelopment be conceived
of as . . . replanning or rebuilding for housing only. The
* . . process needs to be applied to all areas which need it

and for all the classes of uses which, according to good city
planning principles, are appropriate to those areas . .

.

Mr. Bettman illustrated his proposition by referring to a hypothetical situation involving decayed areas immediately surrounding railroad yards. Perhaps it would be better if these areas, only
minimally residential, were redeveloped for non-residential or
business uses. This would, of course, depend on the overall planning
scheme. But if such a decision were made, Mr. Bettman thought,
the limitation to residential redevelopment only would unduly
restrict the redevelopment of the entire area, since the non-residential district was banned from federal aid.8 Thus, the situation
could well occur in which a decaying central business district,
surrounded by residential areas in process of redevelopment, would
continue to be neglected due to lack of federal funds. This then
would raise the next question concerning the merits of surgery on
the fringes of a cancer that is allowed to continue to exist.
Mr. Bettman's reasoning failed to impress Senator Taft, who
appeared to be primarily concerned with the lack of federal funds
for urban renewal activity. He was also reluctant to levy a heavier
tax burden upon the voter and generally unwilling to impose federal programs and controls 4pon urban communities." Senator Taft
opined that if the city had no funds left for redeveloping nonresidential property, it would be difficult to surmise that the hardpressed federal government would have any either.
The virtually complete divergence of views concerning the
merits of improving blighted business as well as residential areas
became evident in an important exchange in which Mr. Bettman
and Senator Taft were again discussing the hypothetical nonresidential area around the city's railroad yards.'0
Senator Taft: For every structure that *is destroyed
around the railroad yard a new one has been built somewhere that is more valuable for that use. The tax revenue
has steadily increased, except in a very recent period.
Surely, I think the city ought to do something about it, but
I do not see any economic disease affecting the United
States of America in any respect.
Mr. Bettman: If 25 percent Of your urban territory is
blighted, I do think that affects the national economy.
Senator Taft: I do not see where it affects the national
income in any way. As a whole, the city is still sound.
The city has more people, more manufacturing establishments. It does not spend vast sums on these areas. Just as
any man who bought real estate there and perhaps made a
profit when it went up in value, and now it is going down
in value and he loses, so the city loses in a particular area,
7 -leorings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment of the Senate Special
Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 9, at 1606 (1945).
These hearings hereafter will be cited as Taft Subcommittee Hearings. (Emphasis added.)
8 Id. at 1607.
9 Id. at 1609.
10 Id. at 1614.
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but it can more than make up for it in some other part of

the city.
Mr. Bettman: What are you going to do with that area?
Senator Taft: I don't care what you do with that area.
That is a local concern. I cannot see how it affects the national economy in any way.
Senator Ellender: Usually, you have a lot of poor people living in those blighted areas.
Senator Taft: I am willing to do something to the extent that the blight is a housing blight.
The concept of federal aid toward urban renewal of areas on a
city wide basis appeared doomed until Senator Taft mentioned,
significantly, that perhaps there was a middle ground, between
redevelopment of housing only, which he favored, and redevelopment of whole cities, which he disapproved. He said that there was
the possibility "that the Federal Government might finance the acquisition where, by doing so, they eliminate a comparatively large
amount of slum housing, where two-thirds of the place is residential . . ."I'

Thus, Senator Taft's conciliatory statement became the genesis
of the predominantly residential requirement, by which it was at
least theoretically possible for a city to gain federal aid for an industrial and commercial area, if at the same time it increased the
size of the redevelopment area to include a sufficient number of
blighted residential dwellings.
Needless to say, Mr. Bettman agreed to this somewhat strained
approach,12 since it represented a considerable softening of the
relatively rigid atitude of Congress toward federal participation
in any kind of redevelopment program involving business property. As we shall see, however, planners coming before Congressional committees on subsequent housing legislation were not disposed to consider Senator Taft's suggestion or the predominantly
residential requirement as the final answer.
II.

EVOLUTION AND EROSION OF THE REQUIREMENT

As a result of the Taft Subcommittee's recommendation, a predominantly residential requirement was incorporated into the
Housing Act of 1949.13 Implied in the term "predominantly," however, was the Congressional interpretation that this meant that
the maiority of the area must be residential, as opposed to Senator Taft's suggestion of two-thirds.
As indicated previously, the Housing Act of 1949 was primarily
a housing bill, and only incidentally was it concerned with urban
redevelopment. There was open recognition of the responsibility
of the federal government to help in the effort to provide adequate
housing for millions who had been deprived of this necessity of life
due to World War II and the concomitant curtailment of dwelling
construction. 14 Of course, adequate housing meant that the greatest effort would necessarily be devoted to rehabilitation of exist11 Id. at 1618. (Emphasis added.)
12 In speaking of the "middle ground" possibility, Mr. Bettman agreed that such a plan might
be feasible since "all urban development is predominantly housing." Ibid.
13 63 Stot. 420 (1949).
14 S. Rep. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949).
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ing housing, as neither the community nor the federal government
had the resources to put everyone in a new home. Therefore, the
focus of activity on both the federal and local level would be upon
the area of greatest need-substandard housing.
In carrying out this objective, however, the Congress injected
the caveat that it did not feel "that the Federal Government should
embark on a general program of aid to cities looking to their rebuilding in more attractive and economical patterns. But . . . there
is a national interest in housing conditions . . . therefore, the

Government should provide aid where the area in question is to
be redeveloped primarily for residen'ial use . . .15
Moreover, it was expressly stated that the scope of the legislation was based on the fundamental premise that the housing situation was primarily a local problem. The first responsibility
rested with the local community, to determine what action was
necessary to improve the housing situation. Then, although federal
aid was conditioned upon the project meeting certain federal requirements, the local community would continue to bear the major
burden of bringing the project into fruition. 16
The expressed desire of Congress to prevent a federal program
from infringing upon local and state sovereignty coincided with
Senator Taft's personal views on the purpose of the housing legislation. It also helped form the basic 7rationale supporting the predominantly residential requirement.1
The House and Senate reports on the 1949 Housing Act were in
accord supporting the predominantly residential requirement. In
the House Report, the concern for federal non-involvement in local
affairs was again mentioned, along with the now familiar palliative
to the effect that localities need not be overly concerned about the
requirement, since most blighted areas are predominantly residential, anyway, and if not, all the community has to do is include
non-residential areas in with residential projects to obtain the requisite "predominance."'"
The position of the federal agency primarily concerned with
urban redevelopment, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, conformed with Congressional views on the requirement. 1 Raymond
M. Foley, HHFA Administrator, stated that he believed the requirement was sound; that studies indicated that from sixty to eighty
percent of all urban land uses, whether residential, commercial or
industrial, involved housing. Therefore, Mr. Foley felt, the ma15 Id. at 13.
16 Id. at 2.
17 "At the same time this requirement will not interfere with the carrying out of effective local
programs which will combine the clearance of slums with sound local plans for the development and
Most slums and blighted areas are predominantly residential in
redevelopment of communities.
character and, in these cases, the bill would permit their redevelopment for whatever new uses are
considered most appropriate by the locality. It is to be noted, of course, that here the test is
whether the area is predominantly residential in character rather than in use. Where blighted commercial or industrial areas are isolated from residential slum areas and hence must be redeveloped
separately, federal financial assistance also would be authorized for their assembly and clearance
where they are to be redeveloped for predominantly residential uses. This does not mean that
cases of isolated blighted areas of business, industrial or commercial use, or open land, cannot be
developed for an appropriate combination of uses under the provisions of the bill." Id. at 13.
18 "[T]his requirement will not interfere with but will rather assist the broad-scale redevelop.
ment of our urban areas. Slums and blighted areas as they exist today are predominantly residential. It is also true that in residential slum-clearance projects, it will normally be necessary to
include some adjacent non-residential blighted areas in order to assure the proper kind of redevelopment." H.R. Rep. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1949).
1g Hearings on H.R. 4009 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (1949).
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jority of potential projects for clearance and redevelopment will
be predominantly residential anyway. In an appearance before the
Senate Subcommittee discussing the Housing Bill, Mr. Foley raised
the economic rationale for the requirement, stating, "I do not feel
that any substantial portion of this initial program should be diverted from our greatest need-the improvement
of the immediate
'20
living environment of American citizens.
Opposition to the solid front of the legislative and executive
branches was indeed scanty in the period immediately following
passage of the 1949 Act. Attention seemed to be focused on other
more controversial aspects of the Act. 21 However, enough criticism
has been generated in the years between 1949 and 1961 to spur Congress to modify the requirement, and to inaugurate exceptions to its
scope of operation.
The first major change was enacted in the Housing Act of
1954.22 The predominantly residential restriction was amended to
the extent that the HHFA Administrator could devote up to ten
percent of available federal urban renewal funds to non-residential
projects. 23 There was, however, a serious limitation upon this provision. Only an area containing a "substantial number of slum,
20 Hearings on General Housing Legislation Before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee
on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1949). (Emphasis supplied.)
21 E.g., toward the HHFA's interpretation of eligibility of a project involving "open land necessory for sound community growth .
Foard and Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation,
25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 635, 668 (1960).
*- 68 Stat. 590 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§1441-83 '(1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§1450-63, 1471, and
1476 (Supp. I 1959-60).
368 Stat. 626 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §1460 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1460(b)-(e), (g), and
(k), (Supp. It, 1959.60).
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blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating dwellings" could qualify
for the ten percent exception, and only if the elimination of these
dwellings "would tend to promote the public health, safety and
welfare in the locality involved and such area is not appropriate
for redevelopment for -predominantly residential uses ....
The Housing Act of 195924 increased the non-residential allocation provision from ten to twenty percent, and also removed
the cumbersome limitation to areas having a substantial number
of substandard dwellings. Then, in the Housing Act of 1961,25 the
non-residential allocation was raised to thirty percent.
Erosion of the requirement was further accomplished by the
addition of a number of exceptions, which in the areas involved,
entirely removed the effect of the predominantly residential requirement.
Thus, in 1956, under what is now Section III of the Housing
Act,26 Congress authorized the HHFA Administrator "to extend
financial assistance under this title for an urban renewal project
with respect to such disaster area without regard to . . . (6) the

requirements in section 110 with respect to the predominantly
residential character or predominantly residential re-use of urban
renewal area ......
Also, in 1959, an additional exception was accorded to areas
involving colleges or universities; the Administrator was authorized to waive the requirement if "the undertaking of an urban renewal project in such area will further promote the public welfare
and the proper development of the community ....

..,2 This particu-

lar exception was broadened in 1961 to include hospitals "in or
near an urban renewal project."28
The most significant, current provision made by Congress to
expand federal urban renewal participation was added by Section
14 of the Area Redevelopment Act, approved May 1, 1961.29 Under
this exception, an area which is certified by the Secretary of Commerce as a redevelopment area will be eligible for financial assistance under the federal urban renewal program notwithstanding its
designation for predominantly industrial or commercial uses. Furthermore, once a contract for federal financial assistance is signed,
it will be continued to completion of the project, even though the
area ceases to be a redevelopment area.
III. EFFICACY OF THE REQUIREMENT
Opposition and criticism to the predominantly residential requirement was neither concerted nor well developed. Not only was
2473 Stat. 675 (1959), 42 U.S.C. §1460 (Supp. II, 1959-60).
2575 Stat. 149, 168 (1961). The present text of the relevant article (110(c)) is as follows:"Financial assistance shall not be extended under this title with respect to any urban renewal area which
is not predominantly residential in character and which, under the urban renewal plan therefor, is
not to be redeveloped for predominantly residential uses: Provided, That, if the governing body of
the local public agency determines that the redevelopment of such an area for predominantly nonresidential uses is necessary for the proper development of the community, the Administrator may
extend financial assistance under this title for such a project: Provided further, That the aggregate
amount of capital grants contracted to be made pursuant to this title with respect to such projects
after the date of the enactment of the Housing Act of 1959 shall not exceed 30 percentum of the
aggregate amount of grants authorized by this title to be contracted for after
such date."
7
26 Sec. 111 of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended, added by sec. 30 (a) of the Housing Act
of 1956, 70 Stat. 1091, 1101, (1956), 42 U.S.C. §1462 (1958).
27 Sec. 112 added by sec. 418 of the Housing Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 677, (1959), 42 U.S.C. §1463
(Supp. II, 1959-60).
228Sec. 309 of the Housing Act of 1961 amended sec. 112. 75 Stat. 149, 169 (1961).
9 5ec. 113 cjdded by Sec. 14, Area Redevelopment Act, 75 Stat. 47, 57 (1961).
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opinion generally directed toward other, more controversial, aspects
of the Act, 30 but the reasons for the provision in the economic atmosphere of post-war 1949 appeared fairly sound.
This is not to say that a state of complete euphoria prevailed.
On the contrary, the city planners and developers, those individuals
most closely involved with long range urban needs, were against
it from the start. 31 The testimony of Mr. Louis Justement of the
American Institute of Architects during Congressional hearings on
the 1949 Act was indicative. Mr. Justement deplored the heavy
emphasis upon housing and the resultant subordination of urban
redevelopment:
Housing is only one part of urban redevelopment and
should not become the controlling factor. We believe that
the administration of Federal aid for urban redevelopment
should not be under the Housing and Home Finance Administration. A sound program for urban redevelopment
must be based on effective city planning and industrial
and commercial as well as residential land use.'Mr. Justement also attacked the "piecemeal approach" of
Congress toward urban redevelopment. Under the 1949 Act, the
federal program was aimed at detection and removal of blighted
portions of the city, the slums, without regard to the state of the
surrounding areas, or concern for improvement of the city as a
whole. The predominantly residential requirement was but another
one of many aspects of the bill that would result in preventing
urban redevelopment by misplacing emphasis upon blighted residential areas. "What is needed is urban redevelopment, the replanning and rebuilding of our cities on a more logical pattern .

. . ."

A first step in the right direction would be elimination

33
of the predominantly residential proviso.
The planners and developers were not alone in their opposition
34
to initiation of the requirement. Spokesmen for business interests,
35
36
non-profit associations, and citizens groups were similarly in
accord on the lack of merit of the provision. The crux of the criticism was the fear that the approach taken by Congress was an unreasoned singling out of one area of need, to the probable detriment of another equally deserving area.3 7 Furthermore, the question was raised as to the need for an artifical federal restriction of
this type where the community itself was the best able to judge
whether and how certain land uses should be changed.-,
3068 Stat. 590 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§1441-83 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §61450-63 (Supp. II,
1959-60).
31 Mr. Alfred E. Bettman's comments before the Taft Subcommittee, supra, are representative.
3"LHearings on General Housing Legislation Before the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 700 (1949).
33 Id. at 704.
34 Statement of John F. Everitt, Long-Bell Lumber Co., Enid, Oklahoma: "If the Federal Government insists upon collecting the taxes and turning them back to the States for slum-clearance projects,
then it should be done without a lot of strings attached." Id. at 634.
:ti Statement of Elbert H. Burns, The American Legion: "(Tihe title would be improved if
it did not limit general land assembly to residential purposes and made possible the eradication of
slums in our cities without regard to any connection with the housing program." Id. at 671.
36 Statement of Edward Weinfeld, National Public Housing Conference. Id. at 233.
37 Hearings on H.R. 4009 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 124 (1949).
3S The customary result of redevelopment projects has been to replace slums with upper-income
housing or commercial or industrial structures. Re-use of project areas for low-income housing has
been limited, partially due to inapplicability of such areas for housing purposes. Johnstone, The
Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 301, 321 (1958).
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Disenchantment with the requirement appeared to increase
in more recent years. Undoubtedly, this dissatisfaction has been
the moving force behind the several legislative "accommodations"
made by Congress which have tended to mute the severity of the
provision. The 1958 hearings on new housing legislation revealed
several direct recommendations to eliminate the requirement
provision was obsoaccompanied by sundry observations that the 39
lete, ineffectual and that it impeded progress.
A savings and loan official declared:
In the same way, I feel very strongly that the requirement that redevelopment must be primarily to erase substandard dwellings is ill advised. Decay in a city can lodge
quite as much in its rundown business property as its housing. Usually, the replacement in a redeveloped area is business, not residential. To insist that only redevelopment
dwellings shall be permitted is,
which clears substandard
40
I think, a mistake.
The basic difference between the advocates of the predominantly residential requirement and those who favor its elimination
appears to reside in the determination of what role the Federal
Government should play in redeveloping cities. From the beginning
of the federal program up until the present day, congressional
intent may be clearly interpreted to favor an over-all housing approach, with urban renewal affixed as a necessary but subordinate
adjunct. What were the reasons for this approach? As we have
seen, there was a good deal of reluctance on the part of the legislators in 1949 to create a further substantial drain upon the already
beleaguered federal budget. Viewing the economic situation in
1949, with the considerable defense commitments of that year, plus
the funds still allocated for post-war rehabilitation programs, we
must conclude that there was substance to this rationale. This, of
39 Hearings on Slum Clearance and Related Housing Problems Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 47, 93, 128, 191
(1958).
40 Statement of Raymond P. Harold, President, Worcester Federal Savings and Loan Association,
Worcester, Massachusetts. Id. at 169.
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course, was the fundamental basis for instituting the predominantly residential requirement. If funds for urban redevelopment
were limited, the requirement would be instrumental in channeling
such funds to the area of greatest need, namely, blighted housing.
While accepting the validity of this reasoning, the question must
then be posed, is the economic rationale, forwarded some thirteen
years ago during times of financial difficulties, still valid under
present economically prosperous circumstances?
The second major rationale that is offered to support establishment of the requirement, namely, reluctance of the Federal
Government to interfere in local affairs, is much less tenable. First,
the federal program has always been a strictly voluntary one, with
complete discretion in local communities to take advantage of the
federal benefits or to "go it alone." The Federal Government has
decided to "interfere" to the extent of offering these benefits to
those communities complying with certain important requirements,
among them the predominantly residential provision. In this light,
it is inconceivable that any more autonomy could be extracted
from local governments by eliminating a requirement than by demanding compliance with it. On the contrary, it is more likely that
a large measure of interference is provided by the requirement in
that it substitutes a degree of federal discretion for local by saying,
in essence, that only a project that is "predominantly residential"
is deserving of combined federal-local effort.
On the reverse side of the coin, it must be admitted that the
predominantly residential requirement poses an ever-present real
or potential limitation upon urban renewal. It is true that relaxation of the rigors of the requirement since 1954 raises the issue of
whether the limitation now has any real significance. According to
4
a 1955 analysis of fifty-three cities cited by Foard and Fefferman, 1
land use of developed areas constituted the following proportions:
Residential
About 73%
Commercial
About 6%
Industrial
About 21%
If these figures may be accepted as representative, then the
present thirty percent exception for non-residential projects, along
with the complete exemption of certain types of projects, should
be sufficient to cover most projects involving solely industrial and
commercial redevelopment. Furthermore, there always remains
the questionable yet apparently sanctioned tactic available to proposers of urban renewal projects, simply to enlarge the essentially
non-residential project area to include enough housing to meet the
"predominantly" limitation.
If it may be concluded that the requirement has been emasculated, then a strong case can be made for its removal from otherwise effective legislation. On the other hand, if the provision still
has any limiting effect at all, we must continue to ascertain and
judge whether it is justified in present-day circumstances.
It has been stated that "a certain narrowness pervaded most
of the discussion and consideration leading to enactment of the
41 Foard and Fefferman,
(1960).

Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, 25 Law & Contemp.

Prob. 635, 671
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predominantly residential requirement, 42 and that Congress has
repeatedly avoided a realistic appraisal of long range urban needs.
It seems evident that in its continued fostering of housing redevelopment as opposed to urban redevelopment, Congress has not
recognized the fundamental nature of the urban living environment. In virtually all of its pronouncements, little attention has
been given by Congress to the basic problem of redeveloping the
city as a whole. In general, the tendency has been to view the urban
blight problem as matter that could be handled in a limited geographical area, a city block, or neighborhood. Simply remove the
''sore spot" and the problem must vanish.
Opposed to this view are those maintaining that the character,
patterns and condition of industrial and commerical areas vitally
influence residential areas, and efforts to renew such areas. Frequently, residential areas that are most in need of renewal are
those that border industrial and commercial areas, for example,
the "downtown commercial district," or the industrial "enclaves"
and "fingers" along rails and waterways. Is it realistic to carry
out redevelopment of these blighted residential areas while avoiding the neighboring, probably causative, industrial blight? What
are the effects of selective or "piecemeal" renewal upon the city's
presumably unified transportation and utility systems? Are all of
these matters separable, so that development of one will not affect
the other?
There is a strong current of opinion that all of these elements
are interrelated, and that "the urban renewal process should be
made sufficiently flexible to permit our cities to deal with commercial and industrial blight and to effectuate broad plans for rebuilding their cores. '43 For example, owners of deteriorating centrally located small business are being faced with increasing competition from more modern suburban facilities. Needless to say, not
all of these businesses will be permitted to relocate. Those that stay
are faced with gradual economic extinction if the city is financially
unable to take steps to eliminate blight and make the surroundings
more attractive. Among the larger centrally located industrial concerns, the tendency will be to move to a city where there is no
blight problem, occasioning a probable economic loss to the abandoned city.
As has been shown, Congress has not stood absolutely still in
adapting to changing needs of the urban community, which now
comprises over seventy percent of the nation's population. The
emphasis on housing still exists, but urban renewal programs have
been changed and broadened almost annually. Throughout all of
this progress, however, the predominantly residential requirement still remains, somewhat like the awkward prehistoric animal
that has somehow learned to adapt to the modern environment.
Although inroads have been made diminishing its effectiveness, it
continues to be a force that must be considered today, if not respected. The question now remains, whether mere necessity to
consider the requirement is sufficient justification for its continued
existence.
42 Id. at 666.
43 Hearings on Slum Clearance, op. cit. supro at 22.
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Christopher R. Brauchli
Donald M. Burkhardt
Robert H. Calkins
Frank A. Ciancio, Jr.
Stephen E. Connor
Frederic K. Conover II
John Joseph Conway
William P. DeMoulin
Edmund L. Epstein
Bruce L. Evans
James C. Fattor
Harold A. Feder
Kerwin H. Fulton
Peter Garrett
David D. Gaumer
Norman Michael Grove

.............................. Ch airman
V ice-Chairman
Gene B. Penland
George Wm. Hopper
Maurice T. Reidy
Kenneth D. Hubbard
Ralph B. Rhodes
James G. Johnston
Charles E. Rhyne
Stevens-Park Kinney II
Richard W. Laugesen, Jr. John 0. Rittenhouse
Myron L. Rubin
Benjamin R. Loye
Hon. John F. Sanchez
Norman L. Markman
J. Albert Sebald
Belmore Thomas Martin
Arthur J. Seifert
Chas. Edward Matheson
Richard T. Sonberg
Stanley R. Medsker
Harry M. Sterling
Wesley A. Miller
Glen E. Taylor
Joseph W. Morrisey, Jr.
Michael F. Morrissey
John C. Wagner
Wililam E. Murane
Marilyn L. Wilde
Arthur E. Otten, Jr.
Michael A. Williams
Richard E. Young
Raymond Lee Payne, Jr.
Martin Zerobnick
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LAW DAY, USA, COMMITTEE

Stephen E. Connor ----. ... . C h ai rman
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Richard W. Bangert ----Wililam E. Kenworthy
Carl Louis Harthun
Sol L. Bloomfield
T. K. Loughlin
James E. Horigan
Jim R. Carrigan
Thompson G. Marsh
Yale B. Huffman, Jr.
Frank A. Ciancio, Jr.
Samuel D. Menin
Hon. Mitchel B. Johns
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Edwin M. Sears
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Edward I. Haligman
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DICTA

LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE COMMITTEE

David C. Knowlton --------------------------------------------------------------------------Chairman
Julius I. Ginsberg -----------...-------.---.---........................--------------------Vice-Chairman
Milton J. Blake
Irving L. Greenwald
Victor N. Nilsen
Thomas C. Chapin
Gerald F. Groswold
William 0. Perry
Morton L. Coggan
Bert M. Keating
Kenneth C. Schoen
James E. Fairchild, Jr.
J. Earl Kuttler
Franklin A. Thayer
Gary D. Fields
William R. Loeffler
Fletcher Thomas
John P. Gately
Samuel L. McClaren
Marcus Werther
Alvin J. Meiklejohn, Jr.
LIEGAL AID & PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMITTEE
Mary C. Griffith ------.... . .. . .. . ... ..... ... ..... ....... . ...... .. ... ..... .. .. ...... ... .... ... ...
. C ha i r m a n
...................................................................... ...V ice -C ha ir m an
Hardin Holmes ----------Walter B. Ash
Dwight K. Shellman. Jr.
Emmeline E. Ferris
Edward M. Heppenstall
Haydn A. Swearingen
George Thomas Ashen
Frank P. Lynch. Jr.
Franklin A. Thayer
James A. Clark
Martin G. Dumont
George A. Reichert
Gerald L. Wallis
Stephen C. Rench
Jack A. Engles
Howard Willner
William F. Reynard
Alan Woods
Robert S. Eberhardt

Roy R. Romer

MEETINGS COMMITTEE
H. Harold Calkins
Lawrence M. Wood _
Henry J. R. Benac
John Brooks. Jr.
Stephen E. Connor
Donald L. Giacomini
Charles H. Haines, Jr.

... C-hairman
------------- Vice-Chairman

James L. Hartman
C. Blake Hiester, Jr.
Ben Klein
William E. Meyers
Allen P. Mitchem

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE
Spiro A. Fotopulos _
James L. Treece --------Samuel Berman
Edward 0. Geer
Duncan J. Cameron
Robert L. Hertzman
Arthur M. Frazin

Gerald M. Quiat
Hubert M. Safran
Stanley H. Schwart7
Harold D. Torgan
James D. Voorhees
--.-.
---.
- .---------Chairman
...................
V ice-C hairm an
Robert L. Nagel
M. Keith Singer
William V. Webb

PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTE E
.
.
.
Chairman
Hon. Mitchel B. Johns ..................................................
--------------------V ice-Chairm an
J. Donovan Stapp ----Ralph E. Hall, Jr.
Hubert M. Safran
Harry L. Arkin
Albert L. Herrmann, Jr.
M. Keith Singer
Judge David Brofman
Stevens Park Kinney
Darrell J. Skelton
John A. Criswell
Benjamin R. Loye
James F. Culver
Robert Smedley
Samuel L. McClaren
Robert Sunshine
Jack H. Dwyer
Donald S. Molen
Anthony F. Vollack
Sheldon E. Friedman
Michael F. Morrissey
Ivan D. Fugate
Kenneth R. Whiting
Stephen P. Murphy
Alvin R. Zinn
Earl T. Greinetz
George A. Reichert
Leo T. Zuckerman
Thomas T. Grimshaw
TOPICAL LUNCHEON COMMIIrl
---------------------------------.--..------------Lael S. DeM uth
-.------Dwight A. Hamilton
Edward Jersin
John R. Bermingham
Samuel M. Kirbens
John E. Clough
Bernard
D. Morley
Donald H. Hamburg
Milton Morris
I-eeon E. Hayden, Jr.
James E. Hegarty
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-----------------.-..
.

Chairman
Vice-Chairman

Forrest C. O'Dell
Victor Quinn
Robert B. Rottman
Darrell J. Skelton
L. Berwyn "Ullstrom

Special Committee on
ASSOCIATION DESK BOOK
........ . .
Chairman
T hom as J. K erw in ----- ----------------------------------James Bye
Richard P. Matsch
Robert Sunshine
Gilbert M. Westa
Charles H. Haines, Jr.
Royal C. Rubright

DICTA
DENVER

Rah2 H. von Hoene
William J. Brennan
H. Harold Calkins
Philip A. Danielson
John R. Evans
Terry N. Fiske
I.eland S. Huttner
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Special Committee an
BAR ASSOCIATION "CALENDAR"

Hon. Mitchel B. Johns
Harold S. Kinney. Jr.
John P. Linn
Jay E. Lutz
William B. Miller
(ex-officio)
Donald S. Molen

-----------_
Chairm an
John C. Mott
Arthur E. Otten. Jr.
Stanton D. Rosenbaum
Warren Tomlinson
Richard G. Wohlgenant
ILeo T. Zuckerman

Special Committee on
JUDICIAL POLL
Richard
Charles
Charles
Richard

D. Hall
A. Baer
J. Beise
M. Davis

Lennart T. Erickson
Pierpont Fuller
Charles E. Grover
Wm. Rann Newcomb

Chairman
Benjamin F. Stapleton. Jr.
Edwin P. Van Cise
Anthony F. Vollack

Special Committee on
MATTERS RELATING TO LAW STUDENTS AND PRACTICING LAWYERS

Thomas E. Creighton
Bruce T. Buell
Hugh A. Burns

Nicl Good

Chairman

Peter H. Holme. Jr.
William E. Kenworthy
John P. Linn

Karl P. Warden
Alvin R. Zinn
Icland S. Huttner

DU STUDENTS:
George McClure

Frank McKibben

Special Committee on
PRECEDENT AND PROCEDURES MANUAL

Donald S. Molen -_
Norma L. Comstock
John E. Gorsuch
Leo Henrichs

---C hairm an
----------W, V. Hodges. Jr.
Louis G. Isaacson
Edward G. Knowles
William B. Miller

Percy S. Morris
Terry J. O'Neill
Royal C. Rubright

Special Committee on
PROCTOR SYSTEM

Sidney S. Jacobs
William Berge
Judge David Brofma n
Julius M. Friedrich

....
Donald P. MacDonald
Emory L. O'Connell
Hon. Saul Pinchick

..........

Chairm n

T. Ra ber Taylor
Anthor ny F. Zarlengo
Alvin R. Zinn

Special Committee on
SPECIALIZATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Hover T. Lentz - __
William D. Embree, Jr.
1_ Douglas Hoyt

Milton

E.

Meyer, Jr.

Kennet h R.

Chairman
Co-Chairman
Whiting
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